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THREE ESSAYS ON DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IN
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Lizhi Wang, PhD
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This thesis consists of three essays, discussing three different but connected problems on
decision making under uncertainty in electric power systems.
The first essay uses a system model to examine how various factors affect the market
price of electricity, and decomposes the price to quantitatively evaluate the contributions of
individual factors as well as their interactions. Sensitivity analysis results from a parametric
quadratic program are applied in the computation.
The second essay formulates the well studied security constrained economic dispatch
(SCED) problem as a Markov decision process model, where the action space is a polyhedron
defined by linear generation and transmission constraints. Such a model enables the decision
maker to accurately evaluate the impact of a dispatch decision to the entire future operation
of the electric power system.
The third essay examines the effect of demand and supply side uncertainties on the
exercise of market power. Solutions under Bertrand, Cournot, and linear supply function
equilibrium (LSFE) models are derived and compared.
The three problems studied in the essays are a unique representation of different levels
of the decision making process in a sophisticated deregulated electric power system, using
techniques from both mathematical programming and probability/statistics.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
Electric power is delivered to widely scattered customers through a three-tiered process. It
is first produced from a number of different types of generating units of varying capacities
and sizes. Transmission networks then carry large amounts of power over a long distance at
a high voltage level. From the transmission sources, distribution systems carry the load to
a service area by forming a fine network.
With electricity being a basic need of society, the electric power industry had been reg-
ulated for almost a hundred years. Under a regulated set-up, the functions of an electric
power system are provided by a given electric utility company which is responsible for sup-
plying power over a specified geographical area and has direct relationships with customers.
A major deficiency of regulation is its inefficiency. The regulator’s dilemma [81] is, while he
or she wishes to (a) hold price down to marginal cost and (b) minimize the cost at the same
time, these two objectives can never be achieved simultaneously. On the one hand, a policy
that holds price down to marginal cost and takes away any dollar saved by innovation will
provide no incentive for the suppliers to improve technology and reduce cost; on the other
hand, a policy that passes every dollar saved to the suppliers will soon be found to have
resulted in a large gap between cost and price.
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A trend of deregulation started since the 1990s, both in the US and in other countries,
with the hope of introducing competition and improving efficiency. Under deregulation,
electricity is traded like any other commodity, and the producers and consumers have the
option to buy and sell power in a marketplace created to provide competition. Transmission
networks can be viewed as consisting of nodes (or buses) and links (or lines). Power is
generated and/or consumed at the nodes, and the lines connect these nodes.
Electricity has two important characteristics that distinguish it from other commodities.
First, it travels at the speed of light through transmission lines, but it cannot be economically
stored. Thus, it has to be generated instantaneously as it is being consumed, and at every
moment, there should be sufficient generation to meet the demand (or load). Second, the
amounts of power that flow through the individual transmission lines corresponding to given
amounts of injections (i.e., the difference between generation and consumption) at each node
cannot be set arbitrarily, but are determined by the laws of physics (e.g., Kirchhoff’s laws).
The maximum power flow that can be carried out over any one line in a given network is
also limited by the physical characteristics of the network, known as the thermal limit.
During the last several years, different market structures have emerged but they all seem
to share the feature that the generation and transmission services are unbundled from each
other. Under all these schemes the generation services are competitive but the transmission
services remain a regulated monopoly that provides open access to the suppliers and con-
sumers of electricity. This latter function is provided by an impartial entity that is known
as the Independent System Operator (ISO). As described in [80], “the minimum functions
of the ISO should include the operation and coordination of the power system to ensure
security, ... the maximum functions of the ISO will include all the reliability-related and
market-related functions...”
Many decisions need to be made under uncertainty by different levels of decision makers
in the electric power systems. Uncertainties in the electric power systems come from three
major sources: demand, supply, and transmission. On the demand side, load is an ever
changing random process that is affected by different kinds of factors, such as season, time,
temperature, weather, and other ones that could affect human behavior. On the supply
side, the fuel prices are changing frequently, and generators could also have unexpected
2
breakdowns. On the transmission level, transmission line failures impose a great threat on
the reliability and security of the power systems.
This thesis examines three problems at different levels of the electric power systems
where decisions need to be made under uncertainty. At a systemic planning level, a constant
vigilance needs to be maintained on the price of electricity, which is such a critical element to
the welfare of the society that nobody can afford to lose control of it. Investment decisions
may be made once the decision makers feel a need to expand the infrastructure of the power
system (e.g., building new transmission lines or adding new generators). A key consideration
in such decision making processes is how to evaluate the effectiveness of the investment. The
first essay examines this problem, and proposes a system model approach to assess the effect
of several chosen influential factors that affect electricity prices. This approach can also be
used to evaluate expansion plans and help make investment decisions.
The second essay considers decision making at the power dispatch level, where the system
operator allocates existing generation and transmission resources to serve the demand. One
of the major challenges is the possibility of a transmission line failure, which is a rare event,
but has tremendous impact. A Markov decision process approach with embedded stochastic
programming is used to model and solve the problem.
The third essay takes the power suppliers’ perspective and studies their market power
exercise behaviors. Market power is the ability of suppliers to raise price above marginal cost
in order to maximize their profits. As deregulation introduces competition into the power
market, it also gives the power suppliers a platform to exercise market power. The question of
whether deregulation is more efficient than regulation has thus been under extensive scrutiny
ever since the beginning of deregulation. The objective of this essay is to use game-theoretic
models to formulate the market power exercise behavior in the oligopolistic power market
with the hope of providing some insights on how market power affects the price of electricity.
The essay is also among the first to take into account the supply side uncertainty in standard
oligopoly models.
Although about different problems, these three essays are well connected. First, these
problems arise from three different levels of electric power systems, and they together depict
a frame of the sophisticated system. Second, the essays are all attempting to improve
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the decision making process, which is complicated by the enormous amount of uncertainty
involved and the critical role electricity plays to the society. Finally, all essays can serve as
examples of applying optimization and probability/statistics techniques and methodologies
to real world problems in electric power systems.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 provide
background introduction and literature review on each of the three essays. Chapters 2, 3,
and 4 come directly from three papers that the author has co-authored with his advisor and
other faculty members. The first paper [89] has been published in the European Journal of
Operational Research, and the other two are currently under review. Chapter 5 summarize
this thesis and discusses some future research topics and directions.
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO “USING A SYSTEM MODEL TO DECOMPOSE
THE EFFECTS OF INFLUENTIAL FACTORS ON LOCATIONAL
MARGINAL PRICES”
The prices of electricity differ by location, because electricity is cheaper to generate in some
locations than others, and generation and transmission capacity is not always sufficient to
deliver the cheapest electricity to every location. From the definition of locational marginal
price (LMP), a widely used pricing mechanism, the LMP at a given node is determined by
the incremental cost of re-dispatching the system to serve one more unit of demand at that
node [45]. In a deregulated market, the LMP at a given location is also a stochastic process
driven by various endogenous and exogenous factors of the market.
Load uncertainty, for example, is one of the most influential factors. In Figure 1, the solid
curve shows the fluctuation of average demand over the 24 hour period, while the dashed
lines describe the range of load uncertainty within one standard deviation for each hour.
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Figure 1: Example of load fluctuation and uncertainty
In the situation when loads reach a very high level, the effect of transmission capacity
limitation becomes pronounced. When the transmission lines get too congested to deliver
cheaper power to every node, more expensive generators need to be used to serve demand,
causing significant price differences between different nodes. The transmission capacity lim-
itation, also known as thermal limit, is the second factor that is being considered in Chapter
2.
The third factor is related to power system security. The term “system security” refers
to keeping the system operating in the presence of failures of one or more components of
the system. Even when a transmission network is operating within the physical limits,
there always remains the possibility that the individual lines may fail due to accidents, such
as a lightning strike, fire, falling trees, weather, or deliberate attack. The loss of a single
transmission line would change the power flows over other operating lines, possibly exceeding
the physical limits. This might result in cascading failures or even collapse of the entire
network. To prevent such a catastrophic consequence, certain amounts of generation and/or
transmission capacity are typically kept in reserve so that the system can withstand these
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types of contingencies. The most widely used capacity reserve criterion in practice is the so
called N-1 criterion, which requires the system to be able to withstand any single contingency
or failure occurrence. The N-1 criterion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. For
the sake of simplicity, here we propose what we refer to as the 90% criterion, which means
that the system operator can only use up to 90% of each generator’s and transmission line’s
capacity, with the hope that when a contingency occurs, the reserved 10% capacity would
be able to provide a buffer that will prevent the system from collapsing.
Market power is the fourth factor that is being considered. As an illustration, suppose
the marginal cost function of a generator at node n is a linear function of the production
quantity qn:
qn 7→ an + bnqn,
where an and bn are constants. In order to maximize its profit, the owner of this generator
may submit a supply function to the system operator that is higher than the marginal cost
function:
qn 7→ αn + bnqn,
where αn > an. This is illustrated in Figure 2. After collecting supply functions from all
suppliers, the system operator then allocates the generation and transmission resources to
meet the demand in the most economical way that satisfies the system security constraints.
Chapter 2 can serve as an introduction to the fundamental settings of the electric power
pricing system, and it attempts to answer the following questions:
1. How can one distinguish the sole contribution of one factor from that of others?
2. How can one evaluate the interaction among factors quantitatively?
3. What would be the effects if new factors were to be introduced?
A comprehensive introduction to locational pricing can be found in part 5 of [81], which
not only provides fundamentals of physical transmission limits and congestion pricing, but
also discusses fallacies of congestion pricing as well as taxes and transmission rights. [76] can
also serve as a good sourcebook on the theory and implementation of spot price based energy
marketplace, whose appendix is especially helpful to those with interests in the detailed
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Figure 2: Examples of supply function and marginal cost function
mathematical derivations. PJM’s training center [1] is another reference for fundamentals of
locational marginal pricing.
In the deregulated market, forecasting and analyzing LMPs become more and more
important for all market participants. Bastian et al. [14] outline basic requirements for
accurate computer forecast of LMPs. Hong and Hsiao propose LMP forecasting methods
using a recurrent neural network [55] and artificial intelligence [56].
Investigators have also been looking at the sensitivities of LMPs to various natural and
human factors. In other words, they address the question of how the LMPs evolve with
respect to shifts in operational parameters. Burger et al. [21] propose a model that takes
all the following factors into account: seasonal patterns, price spikes, mean reversion, price
dependent volatilities and long term non-stationarity. The sensitivity of LMPs to demand
changes throughout the network is mathematically derived in [30] from the OPF (optimal
power flow) problem. Hamoud and Bradley [45] present a methodology to assess the impact
of changes in system parameters and operating conditions on the LMPs using a “Probabilistic
Composite System Evaluation” program.
The perspective Chapter 2 takes differs from the existing literature in the sense that, as
opposed to looking at the response of LMPs to different factors as a whole, we decompose
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the LMPs and quantitatively assess LMPs to the effects of individual factors as well as their
interactions. The contribution of Chapter 2 is three fold. First, the decomposition approach
provides insights on how much contribution does each of the factors and their interactions
have on determining the prices, and in the case of abnormally high prices, points out the cause
of the problem. Secondly, if or when new factors are introduced to the power system (e.g.,
addition or expansion of generators and/or transmission lines), the impact of each of the new
factors can be quantitatively predicted to help decision makers make more effective decisions.
Thirdly, sensitivity analysis results from parametric quadratic programming [15] are applied
and expanded to perform the statistical computation required in the decomposition.
1.3 INTRODUCTION TO “SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC
DISPATCH: A MARKOV DECISION PROCESS APPROACH WITH
EMBEDDED STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING”
Security constrained economic dispatch refers to the program that the system operator uses
to allocate generation and transmission resources to meet the demand. Economics and
security are two major ingredients for an “optimal” dispatch. Economics means to serve
demand with minimum cost, while security requires that electricity be delivered to the
customers without interruption even in the event of component failures. Transmission line
failures constitute a big threat to the electric power system security. Although such failures
are rare events (e.g., 0.714 times/hundred mile-year for 230 kv transmission lines [5]), they
have tremendous impacts. Without proper protection, a single component failure could
disrupt the balance of the whole transmission system, cause cascading failures of other
components, and result in catastrophic losses. The August 2003 blackout, for example, was
initiated by the failures of three transmission lines, which caused subsequent failures of many
other lines, and eventually led to the big blackout, affecting millions of people and costing
billions of dollars [2].
Without the consideration of security, economic dispatch leads to a simple problem:
using the existing transmission capacity to deliver power to all demand nodes at minimum
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cost without violating any operational constraints. Besides generation and transmission
capacity, operational constraints could also include unit commitment [86]. Chowdhury and
Rahman [27] and Huneault and Galiana [57] give comprehensive surveys of economic dispatch
approaches and algorithms in the literature.
System security was brought into the attention of power dispatch after the large blackout
in 1965, when the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was created. Another
large blackout in 1977 led to wide adoption of the N-1 criterion [48]. Despite the amount
of investment and effort spent by engineers and policy makers, there has been evidence that
the frequency of large blackouts in the United States during the period 1984 to 2003 has not
decreased, but increased [47]. The most recent large scale blackouts (August 2003 in North
America and September 2003 in Italy) led to more extensive discussions on the reliability of
power system infrastructure [39, 58, 77, 91] and re-examination of the N-1 criterion [29].
Peters et al. [69] examine the transmission line failure caused by extreme weather,
and recommends strategies to improve transmission network reliability. Chen, Thorp, and
Dobson [22] present a hidden failure model of the transmission line failure, and use the model
to investigate the cascading behavior of the transmission systems. The PhD thesis of Chen
[23] investigates the rare events in the power system that are not caused by uncontrollable
natural forces, and proposes new approaches to identify, evaluate, and prevent rare events
that could cause cascading failures. A summary of probabilistic approaches for power system
reliability assessment is given in [6].
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Various probabilistic methods have been proposed to improve or replace the deterministic
N-1 criterion. Harris and Strongman [46] enhance the N-1 criterion to include the probability
of overload and contingency. Bouffard, Galiana, and Arroyo [17] use the norms of Lagrange
multiplier vectors associated with the post-contingency dispatch to identify credible contin-
gencies that should be considered pre-contingency. Bouffard, Galiana, and Conejo [18, 19]
use the value of unserved load to calculate the optimal power dispatch and spinning reserve,
which implicitly determine the credit contingencies. The spinning reserve is the generating
capacity available to the system operator by increasing the power output of generators that
are already connected to the power system to meet demand in case a generator is lost or there
is another disruption to the supply [92]. The importance of spinning reserve is addressed in
[49] and [82].
Environmental issues have also been considered in the optimal dispatch problem. Ta-
lag, El-Harwary, and El-Harwary [83] summarize the algorithms in environmental/economic
dispatch.
Chapter 3 uses a Markov decision process (MDP) approach to address the security con-
strained economic dispatch problem. MDP provides a mathematical framework for modeling
sequential decision-making process where the decision at each stage affects both the current
outcome and future outcome. A classical introductory text to MDP is written by Puterman
[71]. Compared with the existing methods, the MDP approach has the following advantages:
(1) The risk of cascading failures as well as minor contingencies is converted into dollars and
combined with the generation cost as a single objective for the system operator to minimize.
Although cascading failures have been studied from statistical and systemic perspectives
(see e.g., [37, 85]), no previous study is known to the author that addresses the preventive
and corrective strategies for cascading failures and minor contingencies from the daily power
dispatch perspective. (2) As an important social service, electric power dispatch should be
a continuous and uninterrupted process. However, some existing literature have focused on
a short period [18, 19, 20] of the process, perhaps to accommodate the limitation of the
methodology. The MDP approach, on the other hand, allows one to formulate the dispatch
process as an infinite horizon problem, and both the immediate and the future impact of
an action is taken into account when an optimal policy is determined. (3) The objective of
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most existing literature is to obtain the optimal dispatch decision for the best scenario where
all components are working. However, the real practice needs a program that can provide
the optimal corrective actions in case of contingency scenarios. The MDP model consists of
different states, representing all possible contingency scenarios, and the optimal strategy for
all states can be calculated. An introduction to the formulation and algorithms of MDP can
be found in [71].
The contribution of Chapter 3 also includes the application of an MDP model with
continuous action space. A stochastic programming problem thus needs to be solved in the
policy improvement step of the policy iteration algorithm, since exhaustively enumerating
and comparing all feasible actions is no longer an available strategy.
1.4 INTRODUCTION TO “OLIGOPOLY MODELS FOR MARKET PRICE
OF ELECTRICITY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND UNIT
RELIABILITY”
Since the beginning of deregulation, there has been a great interest in understanding the
impact of introducing competition in the electricity market, and how the exercise of market
power affects the electricity prices [34]. The prevailing equilibrium models of competition in
the electricity market are Cournot-Nash and supply function equilibrium (SFE).
Named after the French philosopher and mathematician Antoine Augustin Cournot, the
Cournot competition refers to the economic model of non-cooperative quantity competition.
A state is said to be in Cournot-Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally
change his quantity bid. Borenstein and Bushnell [16] use a Cournot model to simulate
the California electricity market with historical data. Their results indicate a potential of
significant market power exercise when demand is high. Wei and Smeers [90] use a Cournot-
Nash model to obtain long-run equilibrium, considering both investment and operation.
Arbitrage behavior in a bilateral market is examined by Hobbs [50], who further concludes
that with sufficient arbitrage, a bilateral market (a de-centralized market) yields the same
Cournot equilibrium as that of a POOLCO (a centralized market). Yao, Oren, and Adler
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[93] examine the Cournot competition in a two-settlement market, where the firms enter
contracts in the forward market, and then get financially settled in the spot market.
In the SFE model, supply quantity is bid as a function of the price (or vice versa), in
contrast to the fixed quantity bid in the Cournot model. SFE was originally introduced by
Klemperer and Meyer [59] to examine competition under demand uncertainty. Although
more general, realistic and flexible, the SFE model has been found to be intractable both
analytically and computationally [13], and there could exist zero or multiple equilibrium
solutions. Green and Newbery [40] consider a restricted symmetric duopoly model in the
British electricity market, obtain the general form supply function equilibrium, and conclude
that the government has underestimated the market power. Baldick, Grant and Kahn [11]
use linear supply functions to model the England and Wales electricity market. Hobbs,
Metzler and Pang [53] further restrict the linear supply functions to have fixed slopes, and
formulate the transmission constrained competition as a bilevel game. Day, Hobbs and Pang
[35] also introduce a modified version of SFE — a conjectured supply function approach, and
compare it with other oligopoly models from both theoretical and computational perspectives
with an application in the England-Wales system.
Depending on the assumptions made on the bidding strategy, transmission pricing, mar-
ket clearing, etc., the computational effort needed to obtain a Nash equilibrium of the model
varies from solving differential equations [11, 13, 40, 59], to mixed complementarity problems
[35, 50] or variational inequality problems [90], to the challenging mathematical programs
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [53, 93]. MPEC is drawing increasing interests from
engineers and applied mathematicians in various fields [26, 64, 73]. Chen, Hobbs, Leyffer,
and Munson [26] use the MPEC model to examine the effect of NOx emission permits on
the exercise of market power.
Chapter 4 examines the market power exercise with the following three questions in
mind: (1) how does market power affect market price of electricity, (2) how do various
oligopoly models differ from each other, and (3) what are the effects of demand and supply
side uncertainties on the market power exercise and market price of electricity. The effects
of supply side uncertainty on electricity prices using oligopoly models do not appear to have
been studied previously.
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2.0 USING A SYSTEM MODEL TO DECOMPOSE THE EFFECTS OF
INFLUENTIAL FACTORS ON LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The formation of LMPs is a location dependent stochastic process [76], which is driven by a
combination of various factors. Valenzuela and Mazumdar [87] categorize these factors into
physical factors (which include production cost, load, generation availability, unit commit-
ment and transmission constraints) and economic factors (which include strategic bidding
and load elasticity). One approach to analyzing these factors is to derive analytical ex-
pressions for the sensitivity of LMPs with respect to the parameters of the optimal power
flow models which determine those prices [30], including the sensitivity with respect to bid
parameters. A similar approach has been used to identify market power in the energy mar-
ket [61]. Many of these factors are stochastic by nature, and they jointly affect the LMP
probability distribution. It is therefore hard to determine from historical data the sole or
interactive contributions of the individual factors (see [21, 63, 70] for examples of empirical
studies of LMPs).
However, such information is important and instructive in various ways. The exercise of
market power, for example, has been a big concern since the beginning of electricity market
deregulation, thus it will be useful to quantitatively distinguish the sole contribution of
market power from that of other factors in raising the LMPs above marginal cost. Another
use of this information is to accurately evaluate the effects on LMPs when generation or
transmission capacity expansion plans are being made. The objective of Chapter 2 is to
build a system model to analyze and decompose the effects of various influential factors on
the LMP probability distributions, assuming that the factors are binary variables (inactive
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or active). In this task, the property that the LMP is a piecewise linear function of demand
variation turns out to be handy.
For ease of exposition, only four of the most important factors are considered: load
uncertainty, thermal limit, capacity reserve and market power, numbered by 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively. (The effects of other factors, e.g., fuel price changes, are not being studied
here.) Our system model will analyze the contribution of each single and combination of
factors to the means and standard deviations of LMPs at different nodes. The mean of LMPs
measures the long term average level of prices, while the standard deviation is a measure of
LMP variability in the same unit with LMPs ($/MWh). The statistical models for node n
in hour t are in the following two postulated linear forms:
µnLMP(t) (2.1)
= µn0 (t) + µ
n
1 (t) + µ
n
2 (t) + µ
n
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Here, µnLMP(t) and σ
n
LMP(t) are the realized mean and standard deviation of LMPs at node
n in hour t, respectively; µn0 (t) and σ
n
0 (t) are, respectively, the mean and standard deviation
given none of the four factors’ presence; for i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, µni (t) is the sole contribution of
factor i to the mean of LMPs at node n in addition to µn0 (t), and σ
n
ij(t) is the contribution
resulting from (exclusively) the interaction between factors i and j to the standard deviation
of LMPs at node n in addition to σn0 (t). This is illustrated in Figure 3 for a three factor
case. The rectangular area as a result of three interacting factors is decomposed to µ0+µi+
µj + µk + µij + µjk + µik + µijk. We will refer to the coefficients in (2.1) and (2.2) as impact
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Figure 3: Decomposition of contribution by factors i, j and k
coefficients, and our primary objective is to use the system model to obtain these impact
coefficients.
Section 2.2 describes the system model and the four factors in more detail. Section 2.3
first defines the inputs and outputs of the system model in 2.3.1; and then 2.3.2 describes
the derivation of outputs from inputs by utilizing the piecewise linear property of LMP as a
function of demand variation; the approach used in obtaining impact coefficients from input
and output is given in 2.3.3. A numerical example on the IEEE 30-bus network is given
in Section 2.4, where 2.4.1 gives the data of the test system, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 present and
interpret the time-averaged impact coefficients and their time variation, respectively. Use
of the system model in evaluating transmission and generation capacity expansion plans is




A set of nodesN is connected by a set of transmission lines L. The sets of nodes with demand
for and supply of power are denoted by D and S, respectively. Depending on whether or
not there is demand for or supply of power, any node in N could belong to either D or S,
or both, or neither.
2.2.2 Load Uncertainty
For a certain length of period t = 1, 2, ..., T , demand is assumed to be inelastic: dn,t(1 +
t),∀n ∈ D, t = 1, 2, ..., T , where dn,t (in MW) is the nominal load at node n in hour t, while
t is a random variable, representing the demand uncertainty in percentage of dn,t. Notice
that for a given t, the load uncertainty t is assumed to be the same at all nodes, which
means that demands at all nodes are perfectly correlated, so that they increase or decrease
universally by the same percentage.
In our system model, dn,t’s are assumed to be known constants, and t’s are assumed to
have known probability distributions, which can be obtained from the historical load data.
2.2.3 Thermal Limit
A DC lossless load flow model is used here, which has been found to be a good approximation
to the more accurate AC load flow model when thermal limits are the primary concern
[54, 68].
Denote by zn, H and Tl the net injection at node n, PTDF (power transfer distribution
factors) matrix [28] and capacity of transmission line l, respectively. Net injection is the
total power flow going into a node less the total power flow going out of it. PTDF matrix
gives the linear relation between net injection at each node and power flow through each line.
For all l ∈ L, |∑n∈N Hl,nzn| calculates the magnitude of the power flow through line l. If a
transmission line’s thermal limit is exceeded for a significant length of time, conductors sag
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or be damaged by excessive heating, and the probability of short-circuiting with the ground
increases. Therefore, the transmission constraints require that power flow going through any
transmission line in either direction must be within the capacity:
∑
n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ Tl, ∀l ∈ L
−∑n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ Tl, ∀l ∈ L.
2.2.4 Capacity Reserve
As part of the ancillary services, certain amounts of generation and transmission capacities
are kept in reserve to be able to re-establish the balance between load and generation in
the event of a contingency. However, obtaining the exact amount of reserve capacity that is
“optimal” for all stakeholders is a complex problem, and the solution may vary depending
on the perspective chosen. The N-1 criterion, for example, requires that the reserve level
should be sufficient to counter the loss of any single component (generator or transmission
line). On the other hand, [25] and [89] simply derate the capacities by the forced outage
rates to account for contingencies. As opposed to the above deterministic criteria, stochastic
criteria [18, 19, 38] have also been proposed, where transmission line reliability is taken into
account in determining the reserve level.
In our model, as an illustration, we use what we refer to as the 90% criterion. This
criterion is to require 10% reserve capacities of all generators and transmission lines.
In considering the capacity reserve factor, our purpose is not to study the LMP prob-
ability distribution under contingencies, but simply to address the fact that when system
security is taken into account, the system operator would be restricted from fully utilizing
all the available generation and transmission capacities.
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2.2.5 Market Power
Following [53], we assume that there is a single generator at each supply node (we will refer
to the generator at node n as generator n, which should not give arise to any confusion),
having a marginal cost function:
qn 7→ an + bnqn, ∀n ∈ S,
where qn (in MWh) is the quantity of power generation at node n, an (in $/MWh) and bn (in
$/(MWh)2) are constant parameters. The generating firms submit a linear supply function
for each of their generators:
qn 7→ αn + bnqn, ∀n ∈ S,
and they exercise their market power by strategically submitting αn’s that may be different
from an’s to maximize their profits, and they are simply assumed not to manipulate on bn’s.
Instead of solving αn’s using game-theoretic models as in [53], we assume them to be
known parameters, and attempt to find out quantitatively the effects of their numerical dif-
ferences from the an’s. We also assume that the supply functions stay the same for the entire
time horizon.
2.2.6 Market Clearing














s. t. qn − zn = dn,t(1 + t), (pn,t) ∀n ∈ N (2.4)∑
n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ 0.9Tl, ∀l ∈ L (2.5)
−∑n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ 0.9Tl, ∀l ∈ L (2.6)∑
n∈N zn = 0 (2.7)
0 ≤ qn ≤ 0.9Qn, ∀n ∈ S. (2.8)
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Here, Qn is the capacity of generator n, and dual variable pn,t is the LMP at node n in hour
t. The objective function (2.3) is to minimize the generation cost (using the firm submitted
supply functions); (2.4) comes from the definition of net injection, and the dual variable pn,t
calculates the marginal cost of serving unit increment of demand at node n in hour t, which
is consistent with the definition of LMP; (2.5) and (2.6) are transmission constraints under
the 90% criterion; (2.7) is the balancing property of a network; and (2.8) is the generation
capacity limit under the 90% criterion.
The economic dispatch (2.3)-(2.8) is a convex quadratic program, and is generally easy to
solve in a given hour for a given value of t. It is assumed that generation and transmission
capacities are sufficient to serve demand at all scenarios, so that an optimal solution to
(2.3)-(2.8) always exists.
2.2.7 Other Factors
The system model can also be used to analyze the effects of other factors. For example,
we can quantitatively examine the effects of introducing new generators and/or expanding
the capacities of existing transmission lines. This example will be illustrated in Section 2.5,
where factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 are all assumed to be active, and four new factors 5, 6, 7 and 8
are introduced.
2.3 DETERMINATION OF IMPACT COEFFICIENTS
2.3.1 Input and Output of the System Model
We define four binary input variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 to represent the presence of load
uncertainty, thermal limit, capacity reserve and market power, respectively. Table 1 gives
the interpretation of these input variables. In reality, all the factors are active. In the system
model, however, some of the factors need to be assumed absent so that the difference it makes
can be obtained and used to calculate the impact coefficients.
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Table 1: Interpretation of input variables
i xi = 1 xi = 0
1 Demand uncertainty is active: t is a
random variable, thus pn,t(t) will be a
random variable as well.
Demand has no uncertainty: t is a con-
stant 0, and pn,t will also be a constant.
2 Thermal limit is active: congestion may
occur when demands are high.
Thermal limit is ignored: constraints
(2.5) and (2.6) are ignored and there
will be no congestion.
3 The 90% criterion is used as in con-
straints (2.5), (2.6) and (2.8).
The 90% criterion is not used in con-
straints (2.5), (2.6) and (2.8).
4 Market power is exercised to a given ex-
tent (see Table 2) as in the objective
(2.3).
Market power is not exercised: firms
honestly submit marginal cost functions
as supply functions, thus an instead of
αn will be used in the objective (2.3).
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For a given set of input variables x = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, the output variables of the system
model at node n are p∗n,t(x; t), µ
n
t (x) and σ
n
t (x). Here p
∗
n,t(x; t) is the LMP at node n in hour
t, which results from the optimal (dual) solution to the economic dispatch (2.3)-(2.8), and
is also a function of t; µ
n
t (x) and σ
n
t (x) are, respectively, the mean and standard deviation
of p∗n,t(x; t). Let the pdf (probability distribution function) of t be ft(·), then
















ft(t)[p∗n,t(x; t)− µnt (x)]2dt.
2.3.2 Deriving Output from Input
This subsection describes the algorithm for deriving p∗n,t(x; t) as a function of t from the
system model for a given x.
When x1 = 0, the economic dispatch (2.3)-(2.8) only needs to be solved once to obtain
the output for a given input. When x1 = 1, regardless of the other input variables, the
economic dispatch (2.3)-(2.8) can be represented by the following standard form parametric







x>Qx : Ax = b+ ∆b, x ≥ 0
}
,
where c ∈ Rn, Q ∈ Rn×n, A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm are constants, Q is a positive semi-definite
matrix, ∆b ∈ Rm is a given direction of variation, and  is a scalar parameter. In the economic
dispatch context, Q = diag{bS} and ∆b = [d1,t, · · · , d|N |,t, 0, · · · , 0]>. It is well known that
the optimal solution x∗() is a piecewise linear function of . [15] gives an algorithm that
analytically calculates the break points and the functional form of each segment. We can use
that algorithm to obtain the piecewise linear function p∗n,t(1, x2, x3, x4; t), and then calculate
other outputs.
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We present below the algorithm that we use in our computational experiments to obtain
the break points of t. The functional form of p
∗
n,t(1, x2, x3, x4; t) within each segment can be
calculated by solving at the lower and upper limit break points, and then connecting them
with a straight line. Our algorithm adopts the basic ideas from [15], but is computationally
more robust.
We first review some preliminaries of parametric convex quadratic programming. Let




(b+ ∆b)>y − 1
2
x>Qx : A>y + s−Qx = c, s ≥ 0
}
.
For a given , the tripartition pi() = {B(),N (), T ()} is defined as
B() = {i : xi > 0 for an optimal solution (x(), y(), s())},
N () = {i : si > 0 for an optimal solution (x(), y(), s())},
T () = {1, ..., n}\{B() ∪N ()}.
Define a maximal complementary solution (x∗(), y∗(), s∗()) as an optimal solution such
that
x∗i () > 0⇔ i ∈ B() and s∗i () > 0⇔ i ∈ N ().
It has been shown in [44, 66] that a maximal complementary solution can be obtained by
solving (QP) or (QD) using interior point methods.
We present the algorithm as pseudo codes of two functions: main function and sub function.
The function inputs of main function are coefficients of (QP) and (QD), and the function
output is the set of break points of  within the entire range that (QP) and (QD) remain
feasible. The function inputs of sub function are coefficients of (QP) and (QD) and a
range (, ), and the function output is the set of break points of  within (, ).
Υ = main function(A, b,∆b, c, Q)
{ Step 1: Calculate (L, U), which is the entire range of  that (QP) and (QD) are feasible:
L = min
,x,y,s




{ : Ax−∆b = b, A>y + s−Qx = c, x ≥ 0, s ≥ 0}.
Step 2: Call Υ = sub function(A, b,∆b, c, Q, L, U), and return Υ.
}
Υ = sub function(A, b,∆b, c, Q, , )
{ Step 1: If ( − ) is sufficiently small (or both  and  are infinity with same sign), then
return Υ = 1
2
(+ ). Otherwise set the initial point 0 = 1
2
(+ ) and continue.
Step 2: Obtain the tripartition
pi(0) = {B(0),N (0), T (0)}
by solving (QP0) and (QD0) using an interior point method and obtaining a maximal
complementary solution (x∗(0), y∗(0), s∗(0)).




{ : Ax−∆b = b, A>y + s−Qx = c,
xB(0) ≥ 0, xN (0)∪T (0) = 0,
sN (0) ≥ 0, sB(0)∪T (0) = 0},
u0 = max
,x,y,s
{ : Ax−∆b = b, A>y + s−Qx = c,
xB(0) ≥ 0, xN (0)∪T (0) = 0,
sN (0) ≥ 0, sB(0)∪T (0) = 0}.
Step 4: Recursively call
Υ0 = sub function(A, b,∆b, c, Q, , l0),
Υ1 = sub function(A, b,∆b, c, Q, u0 , ),
and return Υ = Υ0 ∪ {l0 , u0} ∪Υ1.
}
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2.3.3 Calculating Impact Coefficients
Impact coefficients can be calculated by obtaining the system model output for all possible
input variables, and then solving a linear system of equations given below.
The realized values of LMPs according to the system model are determined by the com-




t (1, 1, 1, 1)
and σnLMP(t) = σ
n




LMP(t) represent, respectively, the mean
and standard deviation of LMPs at node n in hour t. Moreover, for all possible binary input
variables x = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, we have the following relation between the outputs and the
impact coefficients:
µnt (x1, x2, x3, x4)
= µn0 (t) + µ
n
1 (t)x1 + µ
n
2 (t)x2 + µ
n
3 (t)x3 + µ
n
4 (t)x4















+ µn234(t)x2x3x4 + µ
n
1234(t)x1x2x3x4,
σnt (x1, x2, x3, x4)
= σn0 (t) + σ
n
1 (t)x1 + σ
n
2 (t)x2 + σ
n
3 (t)x3 + σ
n
4 (t)x4















+ σn234(t)x2x3x4 + σ
n
1234(t)x1x2x3x4,
where µn0 (t), µ
n






1 (t), ..., σ
n
1234(t) are the impact coefficients at node
n in hour t.
24
In matrix form, we have:
Y =M · β, (2.9)




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0




µnt (0, 0, 0, 0)
µnt (1, 0, 0, 0)
µnt (0, 1, 0, 0)
µnt (1, 1, 0, 0)
µnt (0, 0, 1, 0)
µnt (1, 0, 1, 0)
µnt (0, 1, 1, 0)
µnt (1, 1, 1, 0)
µnt (0, 0, 0, 1)
µnt (1, 0, 0, 1)
µnt (0, 1, 0, 1)
µnt (1, 1, 0, 1)
µnt (0, 0, 1, 1)
µnt (1, 0, 1, 1)
µnt (0, 1, 1, 1)






















The matrix form for σ is similar. Therefore, if we obtain µnt (x1, x2, x3, x4) and σ
n
t (x1, x2, x3, x4)
for all 16 possible inputs, then the impact coefficients in hour t can be calculated by solving
the above linear system of equations (2.9).
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The inverse of matrix M is
M−1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
−1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 1 −1 0 0 0 0 1 −1 −1 1 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 1 −1 0 0 1 −1 0 0 −1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0 1 0 −1 0 1 0 −1 0 −1 0 1 0
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1

,
which interprets how the impact coefficients are calculated using the outputs. For example,
µn1 (t) is the difference of µ
n
t (1, 0, 0, 0) and µ
n
t (0, 0, 0, 0); µ
n
12(t) is the difference of µ
n
t (0, 0, 0, 0)+
µnt (1, 1, 0, 0) and µ
n
t (0, 1, 0, 0) + µ
n
t (1, 0, 0, 0).
2.4 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
2.4.1 Test Data
We use the IEEE 30-bus network as an example to demonstrate our approach. As is shown in
Figure 4, a supply node has a “G” in a circle representing a generator, and a demand node has
an arrow. In this example, D = {2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26,
29, 30}, and S = {1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 13}. Node and transmission line data are given in Tables 2
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Figure 4: An IEEE 30-bus network example
Figure 5: Normalized chronological load change
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and 3, respectively. Most of these data are adopted from [53] and [7]: bn’s, Tl’s and Qn’s are
set to be, respectively, 50%, 60% and 80% of the values in [7]; αn’s are set to be 50% of the
equilibrium values in [53]. For all n ∈ D, the average nominal load over time horizon is set to
be 70% of dn in [7]; the relative load chronological changes, shown in Figure 5, are estimated
using the load data of PJM-E [1]; the demand uncertainty t in each hour is assumed to have
a truncated normal distribution also estimated using the load data of PJM-E. Let fN(·) be
the pdf of a normal distribution, then the pdf of a truncated normal distribution fT (·) with





fN(y)dy x ≤ x ≤ x,
0 otherwise.
2.4.2 Time-Averaged Impact Coefficients
We obtain the impact coefficients for both mean and standard deviation of LMPs at all
nodes n ∈ D ∪ S in hour t = 1, ..., 24. The computational time was around 24 minutes on a
Pentium 4 PC with CPU 3.2 GHz and 1.00 GB of RAM. Tables 4 & 5 and 6 & 7 show the









Time-averages are also taken in the same manner for other impact coefficients. The “average”
rows are the average values over all nodes in n ∈ D ∪S. We have the following observations
and interpretations based on these results:
1. Had none of the four factors existed, the LMPs would have been constantly and univer-
sally $39.61/MWh, compared to the realized mean of $62.43/MWh with a $6.11/MWh
standard deviation on average.
2. As the sole contributions of the individual factors, load uncertainty, capacity reserve





Table 2: Node data of the 30-bus example
n dn an αn bn Qn
1 – 0 14.00 1.00 160
2 15.19 0 12.10 0.88 64
3 1.68 – – – –
4 5.32 – – – –
5 65.94 0 8.28 0.50 40
6 – – – – –
7 15.96 – – – –
8 21 0 16.58 1.63 28
9 – – – – –
10 4.06 – – – –
11 – 0 15.41 1.50 24
12 7.84 – – – –
13 – 0 15.39 1.50 32
14 4.34 – – – –
15 5.74 – – – –
16 2.45 – – – –
17 6.3 – – – –
18 2.24 – – – –
19 6.65 – – – –
20 1.54 – – – –
21 12.25 – – – –
22 – – – – –
23 2.24 – – – –
24 6.09 – – – –
25 – – – – –
26 2.45 – – – –
27 – – – – –
28 – – – – –
29 1.68 – – – –
30 7.42 – – – –
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Table 3: Transmission line data of the 30-bus example
line resistance reactance thermal limit
R (Ω) X (Ω) (MW)
1-2 0.0192 0.0575 78
1-3 0.0452 0.1852 78
2-4 0.0570 0.1737 39
3-4 0.0132 0.0379 78
2-5 0.0472 0.1983 78
2-6 0.0581 0.1763 39
4-6 0.0119 0.0414 54
5-7 0.0460 0.1160 42
6-7 0.0267 0.0820 78
6-8 0.0120 0.0420 19.2
6-9 0 0.2080 39
6-10 0 0.5560 19.2
9-11 0 0.2080 39
9-10 0 0.1100 39
4-12 0 0.2560 39
12-13 0 0.1400 39
12-14 0.1231 0.2559 19.2
12-15 0.0662 0.1304 19.2
12-16 0.0945 0.1987 19.2
14-15 0.2210 0.1997 9.6
16-17 0.0824 0.1932 9.6
15-18 0.1070 0.2185 9.6
18-19 0.0639 0.1292 9.6
19-20 0.0340 0.0680 19.2
10-20 0.0936 0.2090 19.2
10-17 0.0324 0.0845 19.2
10-21 0.0348 0.0749 19.2
10-22 0.0727 0.1499 19.2
21-22 0.0116 0.0236 19.2
15-23 0.1000 0.2020 9.6
22-24 0.1150 0.1790 9.6
23-24 0.1320 0.2700 9.6
24-25 0.1885 0.3292 9.6
25-26 0.2544 0.3800 9.6
25-27 0.1093 0.2087 9.6
28-27 0 0.3960 39
27-29 0.2198 0.4153 9.6
27-30 0.3202 0.6027 9.6
29-30 0.2399 0.4533 9.6
8-28 0.0636 0.2000 19.2
6-28 0.0169 0.0599 19.2
30


















1 61.80 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
2 61.81 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
3 61.75 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
4 61.74 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
5 61.85 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
7 61.87 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
8 61.89 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
10 62.42 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
11 62.23 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
12 60.80 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
13 60.80 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
14 62.54 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
15 64.99 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
16 61.49 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
17 62.14 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
18 64.08 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
19 63.54 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
20 63.26 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
21 62.54 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
23 64.18 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
24 63.11 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
26 62.65 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
29 62.36 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
30 62.36 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
average 62.43 39.61 2.09 0 3.57 14.12 0 2.66 –0.11
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1 0 0 –0.32 –0.01 0 0.19 0 0.00
2 0 0 –0.32 0.02 0 0.19 0 –0.01
3 0 0 –0.32 –0.11 0 0.19 0 0.06
4 0 0 –0.32 –0.13 0 0.19 0 0.07
5 0 0 –0.32 0.10 0 0.19 0 –0.06
7 0 0 –0.32 0.15 0 0.19 0 –0.09
8 0 0 –0.32 0.21 0 0.19 0 –0.12
10 0 0 –0.32 1.39 0 0.19 0 –0.78
11 0 0 –0.32 0.97 0 0.19 0 –0.55
12 0 0 –0.32 –2.26 0 0.19 0 1.26
13 0 0 –0.32 –2.26 0 0.19 0 1.26
14 0 0 –0.32 1.65 0 0.19 0 –0.93
15 0 0 –0.32 7.18 0 0.19 0 –4.00
16 0 0 –0.32 –0.70 0 0.19 0 0.38
17 0 0 –0.32 0.77 0 0.19 0 –0.43
18 0 0 –0.32 5.14 0 0.19 0 –2.86
19 0 0 –0.32 3.92 0 0.19 0 –2.19
20 0 0 –0.32 3.28 0 0.19 0 –1.83
21 0 0 –0.32 1.65 0 0.19 0 –0.92
23 0 0 –0.32 5.37 0 0.19 0 –2.99
24 0 0 –0.32 2.95 0 0.19 0 –1.65
26 0 0 –0.32 1.90 0 0.19 0 –1.06
29 0 0 –0.32 1.26 0 0.19 0 –0.71
30 0 0 –0.32 1.26 0 0.19 0 –0.71
average 0 0 –0.32 1.40 0 0.19 0 –0.79
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1 5.62 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
2 5.63 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
3 5.59 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
4 5.59 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
5 5.66 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
7 5.67 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
8 5.69 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
10 6.08 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
11 5.94 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
12 5.01 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
13 5.01 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
14 6.17 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
15 8.09 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
16 5.41 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
17 5.87 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
18 7.37 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
19 6.95 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
20 6.73 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
21 6.17 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
23 7.45 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
24 6.61 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
26 6.25 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
29 6.04 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
30 6.04 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
average 6.11 0 3.24 0 0 0 0 2.34 –0.11
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1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.16 0 0.00
2 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.16 0 –0.01
3 0 0 0 –0.06 0 0.16 0 0.03
4 0 0 0 –0.08 0 0.16 0 0.04
5 0 0 0 0.07 0 0.16 0 –0.03
7 0 0 0 0.10 0 0.16 0 –0.05
8 0 0 0 0.14 0 0.16 0 –0.07
10 0 0 0 0.89 0 0.16 0 –0.43
11 0 0 0 0.63 0 0.16 0 –0.31
12 0 0 0 –1.36 0 0.16 0 0.75
13 0 0 0 –1.36 0 0.16 0 0.75
14 0 0 0 1.06 0 0.16 0 –0.51
15 0 0 0 4.58 0 0.16 0 –2.11
16 0 0 0 –0.44 0 0.16 0 0.23
17 0 0 0 0.49 0 0.16 0 –0.24
18 0 0 0 3.28 0 0.16 0 –1.53
19 0 0 0 2.51 0 0.16 0 –1.18
20 0 0 0 2.10 0 0.16 0 –1.00
21 0 0 0 1.06 0 0.16 0 –0.51
23 0 0 0 3.43 0 0.16 0 –1.60
24 0 0 0 1.89 0 0.16 0 –0.90
26 0 0 0 1.22 0 0.16 0 –0.59
29 0 0 0 0.81 0 0.16 0 –0.40
30 0 0 0 0.81 0 0.16 0 –0.40
average 0 0 0 0.91 0 0.16 0 –0.42
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3. The factor thermal limit does not increase LMPs by itself (µn2 =$0/MWh), nor does the
interaction between load uncertainty and thermal limit (µn12 =$0/MWh). This is because
in this particular example, the transmission capacity is sufficient when 90% criterion is
inactive. This result, however, may not necessarily hold in general, and µn2 and/or µ
n
12
could become non-zeros for other network settings.
4. Price difference between nodes is an indication of congestion. Only two impact coefficients
µn123 and µ
n
1234 in Tables 4 & 5 take different values over different nodes, which means that
congestion is not caused by a single factor, rather it is a result of the interaction among
three or four factors. For the same reason as explained above, there may exist other
combinations of factors that also contribute to the congestion, but the significant source
of congestion is still believed to be µn123 and µ
n
1234. However, those columns where factor 2




34, etc.) can be proven to be constant across nodes regardless
of system parameters, because the only cause of price difference in a DC lossless model,
thermal limit (factor 2), is set to be inactive in the computation of these columns.
5. It is also interesting to observe that µn1234’s have smaller magnitudes with opposite signs
than those of µn123’s. This means that, given the existence of the first three factors, the
incremental effect of market power mitigates congestion. One possible interpretation of
this phenomenon is that market power reduces the relative differences among supply
functions, and thus diminishes the preference for less expensive generators. Comparing
the supply function parameters αn’s and bn’s in Table 2, we find that they have a positive
correlation, but αn’s are less spread out than bn’s:
b5 : b2 : b1 : b13 : b11 : b8
= 1 : 1.75 : 2 : 3 : 3 : 3.25,
α5 : α2 : α1 : α13 : α11 : α8
= 1 : 1.46 : 1.69 : 1.86 : 1.86 : 2.00.
Without market power, the ratio of supply functions of a more expensive generator i and









noticing that an = 0,∀n ∈ S in this example. When market power becomes active, αn’s




























which means that the relative differences among supply functions shrink. This phe-
nomenon has also been observed and discussed in [62]. However, we can only conclude
that market power could mitigate congestion in certain cases under certain assumptions
(e.g., how market power is exercised), but not necessarily so in all circumstances.
6. Load uncertainty is the single primary and decisive source of LMP volatility, contributing
an average standard deviation of σn1 =$3.24/MWh to the realized $6.11/MWh in total.




4 =$0/MWh) is due to
their assumed deterministic characteristics. The interactions between these factors and
load uncertainty, however, have significant contribution to the LMP volatility. It is also
indicated in Tables 6 & 7 that congestion is a result of the interaction among factors.
Figure 6: Time variation of µLMP(t) and σLMP(t)
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2.4.3 Time Variation of Impact Coefficients
We show in Figure 6 how the node-averaged mean and standard deviation of LMPs vary







Node-averages are also taken in the same manner for the impact coefficients, which are shown
in Figures 7 and 8. Only some of the impact coefficients are plotted; the omitted ones have
little or no variation over time.
We have the following observations:
1. Coefficients µLMP(t) and µ1(t) follow a similar pattern of time variation with dn,t. Recall
that µ1(t) represents the sole contribution of factor 1 at node n in hour t, and is the
difference between µt(x1 = 1, x2 = 0, x3 = 0, x4 = 0) and µt(x1 = 0, x2 = 0, x3 = 0, x4 =
0), which represent the two situations with demand at node n in hour t being dn,t(1+ t)
and dn,t.
2. Coefficient µ13(t), interaction between factors 1 and 3, becomes significant when demand
is high.
3. We can see from µ123(t) and µ1234(t) that congestion occurs during peak hours and that
market power mitigates the congestion.
4. The observations on the impact coefficients for σLMP are similar.
2.5 USE OF SYSTEM MODEL IN EVALUATING EXPANSION PLANS
The system model approach described in Section 2.3 can be used to perform sensitivity
analysis for the current system, or to analyze the effects of other factors or system upgrading
decisions. As an illustration, we use the network example in Section 2.4 to analyze the effects
of generator and transmission line capacity expansion plans.
Suppose investment decisions are to be made to introduce new generators at nodes 15,
18 and 23, where highest means and largest standard deviations of LMPs are observed. The
37
Figure 7: Time variation of impact coefficients for µLMP(t)
Figure 8: Time variation of impact coefficients for σLMP(t)
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supply function parameters of the new generators are all assumed to take the average values
of the previously existing ones, i.e., an = 0, αn = 13.63, bn = 1.17, Qn = 52.2,∀n = 15, 18, 23.
Transmission line 12-15 is also planned to be expanded by 15% of its current capacity. The
questions are: (1) how would the LMPs be affected, and (2) how effective would the capacity
expansion of each component (generator or transmission line) be?
Keeping all of the previous factors (load uncertainty, thermal limit, capacity reserve
and market power) active, we define another four factors, numbered 5, 6, 7 and 8, as the
introduction of generators 15, 18 and 23, and capacity expansions of transmission line 12-15,
respectively.
The statistical models for this problem become:
µ˜nLMP(t)
= µnLMP(t) + µ
n
5 (t) + µ
n
6 (t) + µ
n
7 (t) + µ
n
8 (t)





















= σnLMP(t) + σ
n
5 (t) + σ
n
6 (t) + σ
n
7 (t) + σ
n
8 (t)




















where µ˜nLMP(t) and σ˜
n
LMP(t) are, respectively, the forecasted mean and standard deviation of
LMP at node n as a result of these additional factors; as has been defined before, µnLMP(t) and
σnLMP(t) are, respectively, the realized mean and standard deviation before the introduction
of new factors.
We obtain the impact coefficients at all nodes n ∈ D∪S in each hour t = 1, ..., 24. Tables 8
& 9 and 10 & 11 show the time-averaged impact coefficients for µ˜nLMP and σ˜
n
LMP, respectively.
As a result of the combined effect of these four factors, the mean and standard deviation
of LMPs are reduced on average from $62.43/MWh and $6.11/MWh to $49.18/MWh and
$3.24/MWh, respectively. The individual contributions of factors 5, 6, 7 and 8 to µ˜nLMP
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are, respectively, −$6.71/MWh, −$7.61/MWh, −$8.84/MWh and −$0.62/MWh on average;
and their individual contributions to σ˜nLMP are, respectively, −$0.49/MWh, −$1.82/MWh,
−$2.19/MWh and −$0.49/MWh on average.
Tables 8 & 9 and 10 & 11 can also provide information for any subset of factors 5, 6, 7
and 8. For example, to answer the question of “what is the incremental value of expanding
the capacity of transmission line 12-15 by 15% after new generators have been introduced at
nodes 15, 18 and 23?”, we select those columns in Tables 8 & 9 that contain factor 8: {µ8,
µ58, µ68, µ78, µ568, µ578, µ678, µ5678}. The summation of these columns is zero. The same
result is observed for Tables 10 & 11. It indicates that the incremental value of expanding
the capacity of transmission line 12-15 beyond introducing new generators is zero. This
information is useful for decision makers to avoid redundant investments.
By re-defining the factors as unit increments of certain system parameters (e.g., bn’s as
fuel prices increase or αn’s as more severe market power), sensitivity analysis for the current
system can also be performed in a similar way as illustrated in this section.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter builds a system model to decompose the effects of influential factors on loca-
tional marginal prices. Four factors (load uncertainty, thermal limit, capacity reserve and
market power) are considered, and the impact coefficients are calculated to estimate the
contribution of each single factor and their interactions to the mean and standard deviation
of LMPs at each node.
An IEEE 30-bus network is used as an example to demonstrate this approach. The
system model approach can also be used to perform sensitivity analysis or to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of investment plans, e.g, introducing new generators and/or expanding capacities
of transmission lines.
The main contributions of this chapter include:
1. The system model enables one to answer “what if” questions which are generally hard
to answer using historical data.
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2. Piecewise linear property of LMPs as functions of demand variation has been explored.
For a given continuous probability distribution of demand uncertainty and input vari-
ables, the mean and standard deviation of LMPs can be obtained exactly and efficiently
using integration, which is equivalent to infinitely many simulation samples if Monte
Carlo simulation were to be used instead.
3. Impact coefficients provide insights on the composition of LMP probability distribution,
in terms of mean and standard deviation. They can also inform and assist power system
evaluation and investment decision making. The techniques used in this chapter can also
be applied for a more complete analysis of the LMP probability distribution (e.g., on
higher moments).
It is worth mentioning that our observations and analyses are based on the consideration
of only four factors with simplifying assumptions, and are only derived for some specified
system parameters. Further research should (1) consider other factors that affect LMP
probability distributions, e.g., fuel prices fluctuation, generator or transmission line outage;
(2) relax the assumption of perfect load correlation among nodes (according to the load
data from PJM [1], the correlation between PJM-E and PJM-W is 0.8632); (3) relax the
assumption that supply functions stay the same over the entire time horizon, and study the
dynamic gaming behavior of market power exercise under different scenarios and inputs; (4)
examine the hypothesis that market power would in general reduce the difference among
supply functions and mitigate congestion; and (5) compare the analyses from the system
model to real world observations.
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1 50.10 61.80 –8.82 –6.79 –7.44 0.01 5.53 6.37 –0.01
2 50.24 61.81 –8.74 –6.73 –7.38 0.00 5.50 6.34
3 49.68 61.75 –9.06 –6.96 –7.62 0.05 5.63 6.44 –0.05
4 49.59 61.74 –9.12 –7.00 –7.67 0.06 5.65 6.46 –0.06
5 50.60 61.85 –8.53 –6.58 –7.22 –0.04 5.42 6.28 0.04
7 50.83 61.87 –8.39 –6.48 –7.12 –0.06 5.36 6.24 0.06
8 51.08 61.89 –8.32 –6.43 –6.95 –0.09 5.41 6.23 0.09
10 56.28 62.42 –3.54 –2.93 –5.94 –0.61 1.79 4.49 0.61
11 54.45 62.23 –5.18 –4.13 –6.32 –0.43 3.01 5.09 0.43
12 40.20 60.80 –14.62 –10.93 –11.83 1.01 7.79 8.08 –1.01
13 40.20 60.80 –14.62 –10.93 –11.83 1.01 7.79 8.08 –1.01
14 36.56 62.54 –19.01 –14.68 –15.42 –0.73 10.95 10.90 0.73
15 31.43 64.99 –25.21 –19.97 –20.48 –3.18 15.41 14.86 3.18
16 47.08 61.49 –9.87 –7.50 –9.31 0.32 5.22 6.54 –0.32
17 53.54 62.14 –5.42 –4.29 –6.94 –0.33 2.81 5.10 0.33
18 22.36 64.08 28.72 –33.19 –15.35 –2.27 –36.82 –9.29 2.27
19 67.53 63.54 18.28 13.47 –12.31 –1.74 –22.15 –4.83 1.73
20 64.69 63.26 12.76 9.32 –10.70 –1.45 –16.10 –2.47 1.45
21 57.43 62.54 –4.75 –3.89 –4.03 –0.73 4.17 5.21 0.73
23 23.53 64.18 –18.70 –15.10 –31.94 –2.38 33.38 10.59 2.38
24 63.09 63.11 –10.68 –8.62 5.38 –1.31 15.86 8.70 1.31
26 58.49 62.65 –9.78 –7.78 0.66 –0.84 11.86 7.76 0.84
29 55.70 62.36 –9.23 –7.27 –2.21 –0.56 9.43 7.18 0.56
30 55.70 62.36 –9.23 –7.27 –2.21 –0.56 9.43 7.18 0.56
average 49.18 62.43 –6.71 –7.61 –8.84 –0.62 4.26 5.73 0.62
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1 3.91 –0.01 –0.01 –4.46 0.01 0.01 0.01 –0.01
2 3.89 0.00 0.00 –4.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 3.96 –0.05 –0.05 –4.45 0.05 0.05 0.05 –0.05
4 3.98 –0.06 –0.06 –4.45 0.06 0.06 0.06 –0.06
5 3.85 0.04 0.04 –4.48 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 0.04
7 3.82 0.06 0.06 –4.48 –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 0.06
8 3.79 0.09 0.09 –4.55 –0.09 –0.09 –0.09 0.09
10 3.17 0.61 0.61 –3.18 –0.61 –0.61 –0.61 0.61
11 3.39 0.43 0.43 –3.63 –0.43 –0.43 –0.43 0.43
12 5.14 –1.01 –1.01 –4.24 1.01 1.01 1.01 –1.01
13 5.14 –1.01 –1.01 –4.24 1.01 1.01 1.01 –1.01
14 7.69 0.73 0.73 –6.40 –0.73 –0.73 –0.73 0.73
15 11.29 3.18 3.18 –9.44 –3.18 –3.18 –3.18 3.18
16 4.29 –0.32 –0.32 –3.78 0.32 0.32 0.32 –0.32
17 3.50 0.33 0.33 –3.36 –0.33 –0.33 –0.33 0.33
18 12.26 2.27 2.27 11.94 –2.27 –2.27 –2.27 2.27
19 1.97 1.74 1.74 9.57 –1.74 –1.73 –1.74 1.73
20 2.27 1.45 1.45 6.34 –1.45 –1.45 –1.45 1.45
21 3.00 0.73 0.73 –4.82 –0.73 –0.73 –0.73 0.73
23 12.40 2.38 2.38 –31.29 –2.38 –2.38 –2.38 2.38
24 2.19 1.31 1.31 –12.86 –1.31 –1.31 –1.31 1.31
26 2.80 0.84 0.84 –9.68 –0.84 –0.84 –0.84 0.84
29 3.17 0.56 0.56 –7.74 –0.56 –0.56 –0.56 0.56
30 3.17 0.56 0.56 –7.74 –0.56 –0.56 –0.56 0.56
average 4.75 0.62 0.62 –4.83 –0.62 –0.62 –0.62 0.62
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1 3.28 5.62 –1.24 –1.33 –1.58 0.00 0.99 1.35 0.00
2 3.30 5.63 –1.22 –1.32 –1.58 –0.01 0.98 1.34 0.01
3 3.22 5.59 –1.33 –1.34 –1.60 0.03 1.01 1.37 –0.03
4 3.21 5.59 –1.35 –1.34 –1.60 0.04 1.01 1.37 –0.04
5 3.35 5.66 –1.14 –1.31 –1.56 –0.03 0.96 1.32 0.03
7 3.38 5.67 –1.09 –1.30 –1.56 –0.05 0.95 1.31 0.05
8 3.42 5.69 –1.07 –1.31 –1.54 –0.07 1.00 1.30 0.07
10 4.14 6.08 0.69 –0.91 –1.62 –0.46 –0.63 1.17 0.46
11 3.88 5.94 0.08 –1.04 –1.59 –0.32 –0.09 1.21 0.32
12 1.89 5.01 –3.38 –1.73 –2.06 0.61 1.57 1.90 –0.61
13 1.89 5.01 –3.38 –1.73 –2.06 0.61 1.57 1.90 –0.61
14 1.37 6.17 –5.60 –3.27 –3.59 –0.55 3.30 3.52 0.55
15 0.66 8.09 –6.53 –5.75 –6.04 –2.47 5.45 5.99 2.47
16 2.85 5.41 –1.58 –1.32 –1.81 0.21 0.57 1.53 –0.21
17 3.75 5.87 0.02 –1.02 –1.67 –0.25 –0.28 1.27 0.25
18 0.54 7.37 113.23 –6.94 –4.47 –1.75 –13.33 1.65 1.75
19 5.62 6.95 9.17 1.66 –3.54 –1.32 –13.31 1.49 1.32
20 5.25 6.73 7.02 1.01 –3.05 –1.10 –10.10 1.41 1.10
21 4.31 6.17 0.15 –1.16 –1.29 –0.55 0.83 1.02 0.55
23 0.53 7.45 –5.67 –4.32 –7.03 –1.83 18.43 5.77 1.83
24 5.17 6.61 –2.42 –2.42 0.27 –0.99 7.92 0.26 0.99
26 4.50 6.25 –1.91 –1.99 –0.41 –0.63 5.28 0.66 0.63
29 4.09 6.04 –1.59 –1.73 –0.83 –0.41 3.66 0.90 0.41
30 4.09 6.04 –1.59 –1.73 –0.83 –0.41 3.66 0.90 0.41
average 3.24 6.11 –0.49 –1.82 –2.19 –0.49 0.89 1.75 0.49
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1 0.79 0.00 0.00 –1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.79 0.01 0.01 –1.32 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.01
3 0.78 –0.03 –0.03 –1.26 0.03 0.03 0.03 –0.03
4 0.78 –0.04 –0.04 –1.25 0.04 0.04 0.04 –0.04
5 0.79 0.03 0.03 –1.36 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 0.03
7 0.79 0.05 0.05 –1.39 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 0.05
8 0.79 0.07 0.07 –1.44 –0.07 –0.07 –0.07 0.07
10 0.80 0.46 0.46 –1.45 –0.46 –0.46 –0.46 0.46
11 0.80 0.32 0.32 –1.43 –0.32 –0.32 –0.32 0.32
12 0.87 –0.61 –0.61 –0.31 0.61 0.61 0.61 –0.61
13 0.87 –0.61 –0.61 –0.31 0.61 0.61 0.61 –0.61
14 2.28 0.55 0.55 –1.43 –0.55 –0.55 –0.55 0.55
15 4.56 2.47 2.47 –5.12 –2.47 –2.47 –2.47 2.47
16 0.78 –0.21 –0.21 –0.73 0.21 0.21 0.21 –0.21
17 0.79 0.25 0.25 –1.23 –0.25 –0.25 –0.25 0.25
18 4.39 1.75 1.75 –1.37 –1.75 –1.75 –1.75 1.75
19 0.80 1.32 1.32 2.41 –1.32 –1.32 –1.32 1.32
20 0.80 1.10 1.10 1.43 –1.10 –1.10 –1.10 1.10
21 0.82 0.55 0.55 –2.22 –0.55 –0.55 –0.55 0.55
23 4.22 1.83 1.83 –18.32 –1.83 –1.83 –1.83 1.83
24 0.93 0.99 0.99 –5.99 –0.99 –0.99 –0.99 0.99
26 0.87 0.63 0.63 –4.25 –0.63 –0.63 –0.63 0.63
29 0.83 0.41 0.41 –3.19 –0.41 –0.41 –0.41 0.41
30 0.83 0.41 0.41 –3.19 –0.41 –0.41 –0.41 0.41
average 1.32 0.49 0.49 –2.33 –0.49 –0.49 –0.49 0.49
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3.0 SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH: A MARKOV
DECISION PROCESS APPROACH WITH EMBEDDED STOCHASTIC
PROGRAMMING
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In a pool-based electricity market, security constrained economic dispatch is the process of
allocating generation and transmission resources so as to serve the system load with low
cost and high reliability. The goals of cost efficiency and reliability, however, are oftentimes
conflicting. On the one hand, in order to serve the demand most cost efficiently, the capacities
of transmission lines and the cheapest generators should be fully utilized. On the other
hand, the consideration of reliability would suggest using local generators, which may not
be the cheapest, but the supply has less dependence on the reliability of transmission lines;
a considerable amount of generation and transmission capacities should also be reserved for
contingency use. A compromise between low cost and high reliability is thus inevitable.
In practice, the “optimal” tradeoff for all stakeholders is a complex problem, and the
solution may vary depending on the perspective chosen. The N-1 criterion, for example,
requires that the system be able to withstand the failure of any single component (generator
or transmission line). Various stochastic criteria have also been proposed. [18, 19] review
some of the recent publications on the probabilistic criteria, and propose a stochastic secu-
rity approach to market clearing where the probabilities of generator and transmission line
failures are taken into consideration.
This chapter presents another stochastic approach to security constrained economic dis-
patch, which has some significant differences with [18, 19], and is able to address some
important questions that have yet to be answered in the existing literature. First, cascading
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failures are taken into consideration. Although a rare event, the impact of a cascading fail-
ure could be tremendous [10], and the frequency of large blackouts in the United States has
been observed to increase during the recent years [47]. A great amount of research has been
conducted on modeling, monitoring and managing the risk of cascading failures (see e.g.,
[24, 48, 84]). [94] proposes an operational criterion to minimize the risk of subsequent line
failures, whereas the generation cost is not being considered. We adopt the hidden failure
model [22] and take both the probability and the economic cost of a cascading failure into
consideration of power dispatch.
Secondly, in our model, the dispatch decisions are made with an infinitely repeated 24-
hour time horizon taken into account, as opposed to [18, 19], where an isolated 24-hour period
is studied. The advantage of far-sighted decision making is that the long-term economic cost
of a potential contingency is not underestimated when compared with the immediate reward
of taking the risk.
Thirdly, the optimal policy from the MDP model provides the optimal dispatch not
only for the normal scenario, but also for contingency scenarios. A remarkable property of
the MDP approach is that the optimal decision is provided for all possible scenarios that
are being considered. [79] uses an MDP approach to study the bidding decision of power
suppliers in the spot market, and [72] uses a competitive MDP model to examine the market
power exercise in deregulated power markets.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the optimization
problem and makes necessary definitions and assumptions. The MDP model is formulated in
Section 3.3, and the policy iteration algorithm is introduced in Section 3.4 to solve the MDP
model. Section 3.5 demonstrates the approach with a numerical example, and compares the
results with those of other approaches. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
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3.2 DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
3.2.1 Transmission Network
A set of nodesN is connected by a set of transmission lines L. The sets of nodes with demand
for and supply of power are denoted by D and S, respectively. Depending on whether there
is demand for or supply of power, any node in N could belong to either D or S, or both, or
neither.
A DC lossless load flow model is used here, which has been found to be a good approxi-
mation to the more accurate AC load flow model when thermal limit is the primary concern
[54, 68].
3.2.2 Load
Hourly load fluctuation is considered. Locational demands are assumed to be inelastic,
deterministic and constant within each hour. The demand (in MW) at node n in hour t is
denoted by Dn,t,∀n ∈ D, t = 1, 2, ..., 24.
In case the generation and transmission capacity is not sufficient to meet all the demands,
a certain amount of load will be involuntarily left unserved. The amount of involuntarily
unserved load is called load shedding. The associated cost of unit amount of load shedding
is denoted by cLSn (in $/MWh).
3.2.3 Generation
Following [53], we assume that there is at most one generator at a node (as a result, the
generator at node n can be referred to as generator n), and that power suppliers will submit
a linear supply function for each of their generators to the system operator. The supply
function for generator n is denoted by
qn 7→ an + bnqn, ∀n ∈ S,
where qn (in MWh) is the quantity of power generation at node n, an (in $/MWh) and
bn (in $/(MWh)
2) are constant parameters. Each generator n has a maximum generation
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capacity Qn. No minimum generation, fixed cost, or other unit commitment requirements
are considered. For modeling simplicity, we also ignore generator failures, which could be
considered without much additional modeling effort.
3.2.4 Transmission Constraint
Denote by zn, Tl, and H the net injection at node n, the thermal limit of line l, and the
PTDF (power transfer distribution factors) matrix, respectively. Net injection is the total
power flow going into a node less the total power flow going out of it. PTDF matrix gives
the linear relation between net injection at each node and power flow through each line.
For all l ∈ L, |∑n∈N Hl,nzn| calculates the magnitude of the power flow through line l.
The transmission constraints require that power flow going through any transmission line in
either direction must be within the capacity:
∑
n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ Tl, ∀l ∈ L,
−∑n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ Tl, ∀l ∈ L.




Hl,nzn ≤ Tl, ∀l ∈ L
for short in the remainder of this chapter.
3.2.5 Transmission Line Failure
A transmission line can be in either of two states: working or failed. There are two types
of transmission line failures: (a) When the power flow is within the thermal limit, the risk
comes from unexpected events, e.g., fire, falling tree, bad weather, etc. Failures of the
transmission lines in such situation are assumed to be independent of each other. The state
transition between failed and working (repaired) states of a transmission line is assumed
to be a continuous time Markov chain, and the availability of the lines can be calculated
using the historical data on MTTF (mean time to failure) and MTTR (mean time to repair).
Denote by λl and µl (both in #/hour) the rates of failure and repair of line l, respectively.
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(b) When the power flow exceeds the thermal limit of line l, there is an additional risk of
failure due to the overflow. The system operator makes the dispatch decision in such a way
that the power flows do not exceed the thermal limits. However, once a transmission line has
failed due to an unexpected event, the power flows will instantaneously change their routes
according to the new network topology, which may cause overflows on some other lines. [22]
proposes a hidden failure model to estimate the probability of a type (b) failure on line l as
a function f(vl):
f(vl) :=
2.5vl 0 ≤ vl ≤ 0.4,1 vl > 0.4,
where vl is the percentages of overflow with respect to the thermal limit of line l. If the








This assumption is reported to be “consistent with the observed NERC events.”[67]
3.2.6 Cascading Failure
We assume that a cascading failure occurs whenever two or more transmission lines have
failed in a single hour. This could occur in the following two situations: (i) two or more
lines have failed due to unexpected events, and (ii) the failure of one line causes overflow
and then failure of another line. Once one line has failed due to an unexpected event, which
could cause overflows on all other lines, we assume that the probability of a cascading failure
caused by the overflow is a function f(v):
f(v) :=
2.5max{v} 0 ≤ max{v} ≤ 0.4,1 max{v} > 0.4, (3.1)
where v is the vector of percentages of overflows with respect to the thermal limits.
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3.2.7 System Operator
The task of the system operator is assumed to be to make dispatch decisions using existing
generation and transmission resources to serve the demand at minimum long term expected
cost, which includes cost of generation, load shedding and cascading failures. The system
operator re-dispatches the system once every hour to adjust for the demand change and
possible transmission line failure and repair. In case of a cascading failure, the system oper-
ator should shut down the entire system until the system has been restored (all components
examined and all failed lines repaired). The rate of system restoration is denoted by µ˜ (in
#/hour).
3.2.8 Timing of the Transmission Line Failures
We make two assumptions about the timing of the transmission line failures:
(A1) A single transmission line failure may only occur at the beginning of each hour, after
the system operator has already made the dispatch decision without expectation of that
failure.
(A2) A cascading failure occurs at the end of the hour, so that the cost of blackout is
calculated from the next hour.
3.3 THE MARKOV DECISION PROCESS MODEL
3.3.1 Time Horizon {1, 2, ...}
We consider infinitely repeated 24-hour cycles. The time cycle will be incorporated into the
state space, thus the decision making time horizon is: {1, 2, ...}.
3.3.2 State Space S
There are three types of states: a normal state sN , a set of contingency states SC , and a
blackout state sB. In the normal state sN , all transmission lines are working; in a contingency
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state s ∈ SC , exactly one transmission line has failed; sB represents the blackout state caused
by a cascading failure. A contingency state is represented by the failed transmission line:
SC = {{1}, {2}, ..., {|L|}}. To incorporate the repeated time cycles, we include the demand
vector Dn,t as an additional dimension to the state space, and set Dn,t = Dn,t+24 for all
t = 1, 2, .... As a result, the size of the entire state space is (1 + |L|+ 1)× 24.
3.3.3 Action Space As
An action as ∈ As at a given state s is an admissible dispatch decision of using the generators
and working transmission lines (denoted by Ls) to serve the demand Dn,t of all nodes in hour
t. More specifically, it is a polyhedron of admissible actions {qn,∀n ∈ S; dn,∀n ∈ D} defined
by the following constraints:
As















0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn, ∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ D},
where dn is the amount of load shedding at node n.
3.3.4 Transition Probability P (j|s, a)
In an MDP model, the transition probability P (j|s, a) is the probability that the system
moves from state s to state j within an hour given action a. In the remainder, when this
probability does not depend on the action a (as long as a ∈ As is a feasible action), it may
be denoted as P (j|s).
• The transition of staying at the normal state sN means that no failure occurs in this
hour, so





• The transition from the normal state sN to a contingency state s ∈ SC means that (i)
line s has failed in this hour due to an unexpected event, and that (ii) this failure does
not cause a type (b) failure of another line. The latter depends on the action (dispatch
decision). Therefore,




e−λl ,∀s ∈ SC ,
where the probability of a type (b) failure, f(·), is written as a function of the action
a, because the percentage of overflow can be calculated from the action a = {qn,∀n ∈













× 100%,∀l ∈ Ls.
• The probability of transition from the normal state sN to the blackout state sB is
P (st+1 = sB|st = sN , a) = 1− P (st+1 = sN |st = sN)−
∑
l∈SC
P (st+1 = l|st = sN , a).
• The transition from a contingency state s ∈ SC to the normal state sN implies that,
during this hour no line has failed and line s has been repaired:




e−λk ,∀s ∈ SC .
• The transition of staying at the same contingency state s ∈ SC implies that, during this
hour no line has failed and line s has not been repaired:
P (st+1 = s|st = s) = e−µs
∏
k∈L\s
e−λk ,∀s ∈ SC .
• The transition from a contingency state s ∈ SC to another contingency state k ∈ SC
implies that, during this hour line k has failed, line s has been repaired, and no other
line has failed:
P (st+1 = k|st = s, a) = [1− f(a)]
(
1− e−µs) (1− e−λk) ∏
j∈L\{k,s}
e−λj ,∀s, k(6= s) ∈ SC .
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• The probability of transition from a contingency state s ∈ SC to the blackout state sB is
P (st+1 = sB|st = s, a) = 1− P (st+1 = sN |st = s)−
∑
k∈SC
P (st+1 = k|st = s, a),∀s ∈ SC .
• The probability of transition from the blackout state sB to the normal state sN is
P (st+1 = sN |st = sB) = e−µ˜.
• The probability of transition from the blackout state sB to a contingency state s ∈ SC is
P (st+1 = s|st = sB) = 0,∀s ∈ SC .
• The probability of staying at the blackout state sB is
P (st+1 = sB|st = sB) = 1− e−µ˜.
3.3.5 Immediate Cost c(s, a)
The immediate cost includes generation cost and cost of load shedding of this hour. For a





















The objective of the MDP model is to minimize the total cost, including immediate cost and
discounted future cost. The optimality equations are:






βP (j|s, a)V (j)
}
,∀s ∈ S (3.2)
where V (s) is the value (total cost) at state s, and β is the discount rate.
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3.4 SOLVING THE MDP MODEL
We present here the steps of the policy iteration [71], which is a commonly used method for
solving MDPs:
Step 1: Set i = 0, and select an initial decision rule a0s,∀s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}}.
Step 2: Obtain V i by solving
(I − βP (ai))V i = c(ai).
Step 3: For all s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}}, choose ai+1s to satisfy
ai+1s ∈ argmin
{
c(ai+1s ) + βPai+1s (·|s)V i
}
,
setting ai+1s = a
i
s if possible.
Step 4: If ai+1s = a
i
s,∀s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}}, stop and set a∗s = ais,∀s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪
{sB}}. Otherwise increment i by 1 and return to Step 2.
In this algorithm, I is the identity matrix, ai is the action vector for all states in iteration
i, c(ai) is the immediate cost vector for all states given action vector ai, V i is the value vector
for all states in iteration i, and P (ai) is the transition probability matrix given action vector
ai. The value vector V i is updated in Step 2, but is treated as a constant vector in the policy
improvement Step 3.
Since the action space for each state s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC} is a polyhedron, the decision
improvement in Step 3 cannot be done by enumerating all infinitely many possible actions
as in the case with a finite discrete action space, thus an optimization problem needs to be
solved in Step 3 for each state s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC}. In the following sections, the optimization
problems are derived and structured as two-stage stochastic programs with convex quadratic
objective functions and binary variables. Extensive forms of the stochastic programs can be
solved by a Cplex [3] solver.
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3.4.1 Solving Step 3 in Policy Iteration for the Normal State sN


















+ βP (sN |sN)V i(sN) + β
∑
s∈SC
























vsl ≤ vsmax, ∀l ∈ Ls,∀s ∈ SC ;
0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn,∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0,∀n ∈ D; vsl ≥ 0,∀l ∈ Ls,∀s ∈ SC ; vsmax ≥ 0,∀s ∈ SC .
Here vsl calculates the percentage of thermal limit violation on line l caused by the failure
of line s, and vsmax is the maximum of such percentages on all working line l ∈ Ls. The
state values V i(s) for all s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}} from the last iteration i are treated as
constants. This formulation can be equivalently simplified by substituting vsl with v
s
max for


















+ βP (sN |sN)V i(sN) + β
∑
s∈SC
























0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn,∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0,∀n ∈ D; vs ≥ 0,∀s ∈ SC .
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In this stochastic program, q and d are the first stage variables representing a priori contin-
gency dispatch decisions, whereas v can be perceived as the second stage variables represent-
ing post contingency percentage violations. The definition of the transition probabilities in
the objective function contains the piecewise linear function f(·), which can be formulated
by using the standard SOS-2 (special order set constraint of type 2) technique [32, 36]. The
piecewise linear function
f(v) =
2.5v 0 ≤ v ≤ 0.4,1 v > 0.4.
can be modeled as:
v = 0.4(1− u1 − u2) +Mu2
f(v) = 1− u1
u1 ≤ w
u2 + w ≤ 1
u1, u2 ≥ 0, w ∈ {0, 1},
where v plays the role of max{v} in (3.1), and M is a sufficiently large number. By sub-
stituting the transition probabilities and the f(·) function, we can rewrite the stochastic



















































us1 ≤ ws, ∀s ∈ SC
us2 + w
s ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ SC
0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn, ∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ D; us1, us2 ≥ 0, ws ∈ {0, 1}, ∀s ∈ SC ,
where vc is a constant term that appears in the objective function but does not affect the
optimal solution. When it appears in other formulations of this chapter, vc may or may not
represent the same value of constant.
In this formulation, the binary variable ws indicates whether (ws = 0) or not (ws = 1)
the type (a) failure (defined in Section 3.2.5) of transmission line s will surely result in a
cascading failure. If ws = 1, the probability of a cascading failure is calculated by 1− us1. A





Any value above this bound can guarantee the validity of the formulation, since the maximal
percentage of violation max{v} is bounded by the largest possible amount of power flow∑
n∈DDn divided by the minimal thermal limit minl∈L{Tl}.
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3.4.2 Solving Step 3 in Policy Iteration for Other States


















+ βP (sN |s)V i(sN) + β
∑
k∈SC
























0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn,∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ D; vk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ SC\s.
Similar to Section 3.4.1, this stochastic programs can be rewritten by substituting the












































≤ [1 + 0.4(1− uk1 − uk2) +Muk2]Tl,






uk1 ≤ wk, ∀k ∈ SC\s
uk2 + w
k ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ SC\s
0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn,∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0,∀n ∈ D;uk1, uk2 ≥ 0, wk ∈ {0, 1},∀k ∈ SC\s.
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For the blackout state sB, the action affects neither the transition probability nor the
immediate cost, thus no optimization problem needs to be solved.
3.4.3 Convergence of the Policy Iteration Algorithm
For an MDP with a finite state space and a finite action space, the policy iteration has
been proved to converge finitely (Theorem 6.4.2 in [71]). However, the proposed model has
a continuous action space, thus in general the policy iteration algorithm may not converge.
An alternative theorem establishes the convergence of policy iteration for arbitrary state and
action spaces under the assumption that there is a minimizing decision rule at each value
vector V [71]:
Theorem 1. (Theorem 6.4.6 in [71])
The sequence of value vectors {V i} generated by policy iteration converges monotonically and
in norm to {V ∗β }, which solves the optimality equation (3.2).
It is mentioned on page 180 in [71] that Theorem 1 holds for models with action space
As compact, transition probability matrix P (j|s, a) and immediate cost function c(s, a) con-
tinuous in a for each s ∈ S, and S either finite or compact. It can be confirmed from
Section 3.3 that the action space As is compact, transition probability P (j|s, a) and imme-
diate cost c(s, a) are continuous in a for each s ∈ {{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}}, and the state space
{{sN} ∪ SC ∪ {sB}} is finite. Therefore, the convergence of policy iteration for this model
can be established.
Corollary 1. As long as stochastic programs (3.3) and (3.4) are solved to optimality, the
sequence of value vectors {V i} generated by the policy iteration in Section 3.4 converges
monotonically and in norm to {V ∗β }, which solves the optimality equation (3.2).
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3.5 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Figure 9 shows a five-bus network example from the website (http://www.pjm.com) of PJM
(Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland Interconnection), which is a regional transmission or-
ganization (RTO) in the eastern United States that operates the world’s largest competitive
wholesale electricity market. In Figure 9, a ‘G’ in a circle represents a generator, and an
arrow represents demand. In this example, N ={A, B, C, D, E}, D ={B, C, D}, S ={A, C,
D, E}, L ={A-B, B-C, C-D, D-E, E-A, A-D}. Node and transmission line data are given in
Tables 12 and 13. Discount rate β is set to be 0.99.
Figure 9: A five-bus test example
Table 12: Node data for a five-bus example
n Dn an bn Qn
A – 7 0.0452 210
B 250 – – –
C 350 13.51 0.0700 520
D 250 15 0.1210 200
E – 9 0.0920 600
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Table 13: Transmission line data for a five-bus example
line resistance reactance thermal limit MTTF MTTR
R (Ω) X (Ω) (MW) (Hour) (Hour)
A-B 0 0.0281 377 18015 43
B-C 0 0.0108 77 6924 17
C-D 0 0.0297 223 19041 46
D-E 0 0.0297 240 19041 46
E-A 0 0.0064 360 4103 10
A-D 0 0.0304 159 19490 47
Policy iteration is implemented in Matlab [4] and Cplex [3]. We present the results of
this example and answer the following questions.
• How is the initial decision rule determined?
The initial decision rule (in Step 1 of policy iteration) is obtained by solving the non-































0 ≤ qn ≤ Qn, ∀n ∈ S; dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ D.
The objective here is only to minimize the immediate cost, ignoring the future cost. The
initial generation decisions at the normal state sN and the contingency state s = {A-B}
for the 24-hour period are shown in Figures 10 and 11, respectively.
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Figure 10: Initial generation decisions for sN
Figure 11: Initial generation decisions for s = {A-B}
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Figure 12: Optimal generation decisions for sN
Figure 13: Optimal generation decisions for s = {A-B}
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• How fast does the policy iteration algorithm converge?
The algorithm converges in two iterations within a few seconds. The optimal generation
decisions at the normal state sN and the contingency state s = {A-B} for the 24-hour
period are shown in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.
Compared to the initial generation decisions, the optimal ones at the normal state use
generators C and D more, but use generator E less. This is because generator E depends
on transmission lines to supply, which has some risk that the optimal generation decisions
are trying to avoid. The optimal generation decisions at the contingency state s = {A-
B} have similar changes over the initial ones, but the differences are very small. This is
because the failure of line {A-B} has already reduced the use of generator E significantly
even in the non-security constrained economic dispatch.
• How are the values of the initial decisions and N-1 criterion evaluated?
The values of the initial decisions and N-1 criterion are evaluated by solving the linear
system of equations given in Step 2 of the policy iteration, where the action ai is obtained
using the initial dispatch decision and N-1 criterion, respectively.
• How much improvement do the optimal decisions have over the initial deci-
sions and the N-1 criterion?
The comparison of total costs between optimal and initial decisions are given for the
normal state sN and the contingency state s = {A-B} in Figure 14. The N-1 criterion,
as has been explained, requires that the system withstands any single line failure. From
the comparison of total costs between optimal decisions and N-1 criterion in Figure 15,
we can see that the expected total cost of the optimal decisions is significantly less (in
the order of million dollars) than that of the N-1 criterion.
For the normal state sN , we also compare the probability that a system is in each
of the possible states in Table 14, and the expected total cost of being in each of the
possible states in Table 15. The stationary probability is obtained by solving the following
equation
pi>P (a∗) = pi>,
where pi is the stationary probability vector, while P (a∗) is the transition probability
matrix under the optimal policy a∗. The stationary cost is given by the optimal solution
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Figure 14: Total cost comparisons between optimal and initial decisions
Figure 15: Total cost comparisons between optimal decision and N-1 criterion
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Table 14: Comparisons of state probabilities for the normal state sN
Normal A–B B-C C–D D–E E–A A–D Blackout
Initial 0.917 0.012 0.002 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.016 0.023
MDP 0.918 0.012 0.002 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.016 0.020
N–1 0.918 0.014 0.002 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.016 0.018
Table 15: Comparisons of state costs (in $106) for the normal state sN
Normal A–B B-C C–D D–E E–A A–D Blackout
Initial 1.796 3.590 1.831 1.906 1.911 1.807 1.908 10.830
MDP 1.796 3.590 1.831 1.906 1.911 1.807 1.908 10.830
N–1 7.269 7.470 6.493 7.392 7.482 7.288 7.486 14.535
of the state value V ∗ to the MDP model. It can be seen from Tables 14 and 15 that the
MDP solution is almost as cost efficient as the initial economic dispatch solution, but it
also has a security level almost as high as the N–1 criterion. Therefore, the long-term
expected cost for the MDP solution outperforms both of the other approaches, as is
confirmed in Table 16.







We have introduced a Markov Decision Process model for the security constrained economic
dispatch problem. This approach quantitatively takes the cascading failure into modeling
consideration, and minimizes the long-term expected total cost. The optimal solution of the
model provides the cost-minimizing decision rules not only for the normal state but also for
all contingency states. The numerical example demonstrates the advantage of this model
over non-security constrained economic dispatch and N-1 criterion.
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4.0 OLIGOPOLY MODELS FOR MARKET PRICE OF ELECTRICITY
UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND UNIT RELIABILITY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the new deregulated environment, the price of electricity is no longer set by regulators;
instead it is set by market forces. Since investment and operating decisions will be made
based on the anticipated prices, there is a strong interest in modeling them using available
engineering and economic information [78]. In the recent literature, three oligopoly models
(together with their various variants and extensions) have been proposed to depict the be-
havior of market prices. These are the Bertrand, Cournot, and SFE models [12, 33, 40, 75].
For the most part, with the exception of the SFE, these models are deterministic. The elec-
tricity price, however, depends on a variety of physical and economic factors, many of which
are stochastic by nature. The physical factors include production cost, load, generation and
transmission reliability, unit commitment, and transmission constraints. The economic fac-
tors include strategic bidding and load elasticity. In this chapter, we enhance the oligopoly
models by incorporating the stochasticity associated with the load and the generation avail-
abilities. We obtain the Nash equilibrium solutions for the Cournot and SFE models, in
which generating firms compete with each other to maximize their own expected profits.
The current literature on these models primarily considers random factors on the demand
side, but it does not consider random factors present in the supply side of the market [40, 59].
In their elegant formulation of the SFE, Klemperer and Meyer [59] consider a stochastic
demand function by assuming that the quantity demanded is a function of both the price
p and a scalar random variable . Thus, the demand function is represented by D(p, ).
Under the assumption that the second partial derivative Dp = 0, they express the Nash
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equilibrium solution in terms of differential equations. Their solution does not apply without
this condition or when there are uncertainties associated with the supply side such as fuel
prices and production cost functions. Our contribution is to include some of these sources
of uncertainties in the oligopoly models for electricity prices. We conjecture that when these
sources of uncertainties are included, a supply function equilibrium as general as that of
Klemperer and Meyer may not exist. Cournot model can be seen as a restricted special
case of SFE. Using the best response function, our approach obtains the Nash Cournot
equilibrium solution, taking into account both demand and supply side uncertainties.
Theoretical research and computational studies on SFE models have shown considerable
difficulties in computing equilibrium solutions [12, 40, 59]. In fact, multiple equilibrium
solutions may exist, which carry additional equilibrium selection problem. Thus, most of the
SFE studies have been designed assuming a linear supply function [41, 42, 74]. Klemperer
and Meyer [59] have shown that in the special case of symmetric firms with linear marginal
costs and random shock with full support ( ≥ 0), a unique equilibrium solution exists, and
this solution is a linear function. If the random shock does not have full support, which
is a more realistic assumption, the linear supply function is not the unique equilibrium.
Nevertheless, according to Green [41], a linear supply function is more tractable and for low
levels of demand, it can be seen as an approximation to a set of equilibrium supply functions.
The assumption of linear supply functions has been used in Green [42] to study the effects
of the contract market on a pool market. It has also been used by Rudkevich [74] in his
investigation of the bidding learning process. The learning model consists of generating
companies adjusting their supply functions as aggregated-bid information on the market is
revealed. Rudkevich shows that if the initial supply functions submitted by the firms are
based on their marginal costs, the sequence of supply functions converges to a linear SFE.
In this chapter, we have thus restricted ourselves to linear supply functions and attempted
to obtain an equilibrium solution for this class (LSFE).
The numerical examples given here are based on a linear demand function with multiple
asymmetric firms. Our model assumes that the transmission grid is free of congestion. In the
Cournot model, adding transmission constraints to the market models would involve solving
a mixed complementarity problem [51]. These constraints in conjunction with supply and
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demand uncertainties would make the models hard to solve. A similar difficulty would occur
with the SFE model. Our assumption is reasonable under low demand conditions (off-peak
hours) during which the power system remains unconstrained by congested lines. We use
best response function approach to obtain the Nash Cournot equilibrium, and nonlinear
optimization for LSFE.
Section 4.2 states the assumptions used to represent the supply and demand sides for
the electricity market. Section 4.3 provides the derivation of the Nash Cournot equilibrium
under the stochastic setup. Section 4.4 gives the corresponding approach for the LSFE
model. Section 4.5 gives numerical examples for a market consisting of three asymmetric
firms. We compare here the results of the mean and standard deviation of equilibrium prices,
profits, and the quantities supplied under these two models. As an added comparison, we also
provide the corresponding statistics resulting from the perfect SFE and Bertrand models.
Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE STOCHASTIC
MODELS
This chapter considers the following decision situation in the face of uncertainty. A com-
mitment is being made at some point in time (either to quantity, in the case of the Cournot
model, or to the slope and intercept of the bid curve in the case of the SFE model), before the
bidder knows the exact load level or generator availabilities. For example, assume that bids
are taken hour by hour, and the commitment is “day ahead” (such as 12 noon the previous
day, as in the PJM market [www.pjm.com]). The load uncertainty is due to errors in the
short term load forecasts (typically with a standard deviation of 2-5% [8, 9]). The generator
availability uncertainty is about generators that are currently available, but might have a
forced outage between the time of making the bid and 24 hours away. We have obtained the
appropriate estimates of generator availabilities using the failure and repair rates given for
the IEEE Reliability Test System [43] and using the Markov process assumption as described
in the following paragraph.
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We assume that there are n competing asymmetric firms with firm i having Ni− 1 units
available for production. The capacity of the jth unit, j = 1, . . . , Ni−1 of firm i is represented
by cij. To account for a firm’s ability to purchase energy at a higher cost from an outside
source, we define an Ni
th unit which represents this available source. As a result, we assume
ciNi = ∞,∀i = 1, ..., n. We assume that each firm’s units are dispatched according to their
constant marginal cost, which is represented by dij. The operating state of generator j for
firm i at time t is denoted by a two-state stochastic process Yij(t) that takes the value 1 when
the unit is up and 0 otherwise. For the purpose of the numerical examples given in Section
4.5, we will assume that this process is a continuous time Markov chain with a failure rate
λij and a repair rate µij. The steady state availability of the unit which we denote by pij is
given by
pij = P [Yij(∞) = 1] = µij
λij + µij
.
We will abbreviate Yij(∞) by Yij, thus we have P [Yij = 1] = pij. We assume piNi = 1. That
is, the outside source is always available. We also assume that the Yij’s and the load L are
independent. It is well known [60] that under the Markov assumption,






Thus the average availability during the interval [0, T ] given that the unit (i, j) was up at
























1− e−(λij+µij)T ] .
In Section 4.5, the first example uses the steady-state availability term pij whereas the second
one gives results for day ahead bids using the quantity p¯ij(T ) for the average availability
where T = 24 hours.
We assume a constant marginal cost for each generating unit (i, j). This results in a
piecewise linear production cost function for each firm i. Our model also makes several
simplifying assumptions. First, it does not consider unit commitment. Uncertainty in load
by itself (due to 24 hour-ahead load forecast error) can make an important difference in
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unit commitment. Wrong unit commitments can have negative economic consequences [52].
Uncertainty in generator availability would certainly magnify this effect. The zero-one nature
of commitment, along with minimum run levels and ramp rates, may make it impossible to
stack units in merit order. Secondly, we have assumed that if a firm commits one of its
generators to provide a specified quantity ahead, but one of its own generators fails, it will
access the balancing market if its quantity commitment is greater than the sum of their
available capacities, and the cost for this transaction is fixed. But, in reality, it will go into
the real time market and buy at the prevailing market price to make up for the shortfall.
This may be a price that is quite low, or it might be very high if the system is in a shortage
state. Also, if the balancing energy prices are below the generating costs, the firm will surely
opt to access the market even if it has ample generation. Inclusion of this exogenous factor
will make our model complicated, and we do not consider this here.
At price P , the actual demand function Q = D(L, P ) is a random variable, where the
load L is the source of uncertainty. It is assumed that L has a known probability distribution.
Each firm will select its bid to maximize its expected profit. We describe this process in detail
and provide Nash equilibrium solution for each of the bidding models.
4.3 COURNOT MODEL
In the Cournot model, we assume ∂D(L,P )
∂P
< 0 and denote the inverse function of D(L, P ) as
P (L,D). In this model, each firm simultaneously bids a quantity qi that it is willing to supply.
Notice that qi is an MWh variable, and it represents the firm amount of generation that the
firm commits itself to. The market clearing price P ∗ is determined after the actual demand
is observed. We denote the market clearing price P ∗ as the price where D(l, P ∗) =
∑n
i=1 qi
or P ∗ = P (l,
∑n
i=1 qi), where l is the realization of L. We assume that if P
∗ < 0, no trade is
made.
Firms choose their bids qi in order to maximize their expected profits. Given the sum of
other firms’ bids q−i, the profit of firm i is a function of qi:
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pii(qi | q−i) = qiP (L, q−i + qi)+ − Costi(qi),
where Costi(qi) is the cost for firm i to produce the quantity of qi, and P (L, q−i + qi)+ :=
max{P (L, q−i + qi), 0}. Clearly, the cost is a random variable due to uncertainty resulting
from supply side unit availabilities. Therefore, each firm’s objective is to select a qi to
maximize its expected profit, which is the expected revenue less the expected costs:
E[pii(qi | q−i)] = qi
∫ ∞
−∞
P (l, q−i + qi)+f(l)dl − EY [Costi(qi)]. (4.1)
where EY [·] indicates that expectation is taking in terms of random variable Y .
For ease of exposition, we assume that D(L, P ) is a linear function, i.e. Q = D(L, P ) =
L −mP for a constant m > 0, and then P (L,Q) = (L−Q)
m
. We assume that L is uniformly
distributed on [L1, L2]. This assumption allows us to obtain closed form expressions for the
solutions of the integrals that appear in the computations, although the basic idea of the
approach also applies to more general distributions (In the literature, the normal distribution
has been considered to be more representative of actual forecast errors). Assuming further




P (l, q−i+qi)+f(l)dl = qi
[L2 −max(L1, q−i + qi)][L2 +max(L1, q−i + qi)− 2(q−i + qi)]
2m(L2 − L1) .
To aid in the computation of a firm’s expected cost, we define the following expression:
Ci,j(q) :=

EY [Costi(q)] if j = 1,
EY [Costi(q) | Yik = 0, for k = 1, . . . , j − 1] for j = 2, . . . , Ni.
Here Cij(q) represents the expected cost of firm i producing q units of energy when generating
units 1, . . . , j − 1 are not available. Then we have
Ci,Ni(q) = qdiNi ,
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and for k = 1, 2, ..., Ni − 1, we obtain the following recursive relationship:
Ci,j(q) =

pijdijq + (1− pij)Ci,j+1(q) 0 ≤ q ≤ cij;
pij{dijcij + Ci,j+1(q − cij)}+ (1− pij)Ci,j+1(q) q > cij.
Therefore, Ci,j(·) is a piecewise linear function and EY [Costi(qi)] = Ci,1(qi) can be calculated
recursively. We then rewrite the expected profit function as
E[pii(qi | q−i)] = qi
∫ ∞
−∞
P (l, q−i + qi)+f(l)dl − EY [Costi(qi)] =: Ri(qi | q−i)− Ci,1(qi).
Here, the term Ri(qi | q−i) is the expected revenue function and the Ci,1(qi) is the expected
production costs. Equation (4.1) is the expected profit given the total bid of the other firms.
The best response for firm i is to bid a quantity q∗i in order to maximize (4.1). Therefore,
q∗i is a function of q−i, in other words, if firm i observes the other firms’ total bids q−i, then
q∗i (q−i) is its optimal bid. Thus q
∗
i (·) is the best response function for firm i. We can further
derive the best response function in terms of Q = q−i+q∗i (q−i), so q
∗





means that if the market total bid is Q, then firm i must have bid q∗i (Q). Under the uniform
distribution assumption of load uncertainty L, best response functions q∗i (q−i) and q
∗
i (Q)
are piecewise linear and can be analytically obtained. Then the Nash Cournot equilibrium









i (Q) and the 45 degree line q(Q) = Q. Each




The computations are further described by means of an illustration in Section 4.5.2.
Let q∗ and Q∗ be the optimal bids under equilibrium, then the equilibrium price becomes
P ∗ = P (L,Q∗) = L−Q
∗
m
, whose mean and variance can be calculated accordingly. In the
specific example above, E[P ∗] = E[L]−Q
∗
m
and V ar[P ∗] = V ar[L]
m2
. Notice that the variance of
the equilibrium price only depends on the variance of the load. Similarly to the expected
cost, we can also recursively calculate the variance of profit under equilibrium:
V ar[pii(qi | q−i)] = q2i
∫ ∞
−∞












V arY [Costi(q)] if j = 1,
V arY [Costi(q) | Yik = 0, for k = 1, . . . , j − 1] for j = 2, . . . , Ni.
Then,
Vi,Ni(q) = 0,
and for k = 1, 2, ..., Ni − 1,
Vi,j(q) =

(1− pij)Vi,j+1(q) + pij(1− pij)[dijq − Ci,j+1(q)]2, 0 ≤ q ≤ ci,j,
pijVi,j+1(q − cij) + (1− pij)Vi,j+1(q)
+pij(1− pij)[dijcij + Ci,j+1(q − cij)− Ci,j+1(q)]2, q > cij.
4.4 LINEAR SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM
In the SFE model, firms simultaneously bid their supply functions Si(P ). After the sup-
ply bids are submitted, the actual demand function is observed. Thereafter, the market
clearing price P ∗ is obtained such that D(l, P ∗) =
∑n
i=1 Si(P
∗), where l is the realization
of uncertainty L. We assume that if P ∗ < 0, no trade is made. In this section, we restrict
our attention to linear supply functions, i.e Si(P ) = ai + biP , and a linear demand function
D(L, P ) = L−mP . Here, L is a random variable and m is a constant.
Again, firms choose their bids Si(P ) = ai + biP in order to maximize their expected
profits. Given the sum of other firms’ bids S−i(P ) = a−i + b−iP and using the equation












The profit of firm i is a function of Si(P ), or equivalently, a function of ai and xi:
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pii(ai, xi) = Si(P
∗)P ∗ − Costi[Si(P ∗)]
=
(1− xi)(L− ai − a−i)+[ai + xi(L− ai − a−i)+]
m+ b−i
−Costi[ai + xi(L− ai − a−i)+],
where Costi(q) is the cost for firm i to produce the quantity of q, which now involves both




aiE[L− ai − a−i]+ + xiE [(L− ai − a−i)+]2
}
m+ b−i
−EY,L{Costi[ai + xi(L− ai − a−i)+]}.
Specifically, if L is uniformly distributed on [L1, L2] (assuming L2 ≥ ai + a−i), then




(l − ai − a−i)dl
=
[L2 −max(L1, ai + a−i)][L2 +max(L1, ai + a−i)− 2(ai + a−i)]
2(L2 − L1)
and




(l − ai − a−i)2dl
=
(L2 − ai − a−i)3 − [max(L1, ai + a−i)− ai − a−i]3
3(L2 − L1) .
As in the Cournot model, we again develop a recursive relationship for determining the
expected cost under a given supply function. For x and α ≥ 0, define
C¯Li,j(x, α, β) =

EY,L{Costi[α+ (Lx− β)+]},
EY,L{Costi[α+ (Lx− β)+] | Yik = 0, k = 1, ..., j − 1} for j = 2, ..., Ni.
Then,
C¯Li,Ni(x, α, β) = E[α+ (Lx− β)+]dNi (4.2)
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and for j = 1, ..., Ni − 1:
C¯Li,j(x, α, β) =

pijdijE[α+ (Lx− β)+] + (1− pij)C¯Li,j+1(x, α, β), α + (L2x− β)+ ≤ ci,j;
pijdijE{cij − [cij − α− (Lx− β)+]+} α+ (L1x− β)+ < cij,
+pijC¯
L
i,j+1(x, 0, β + cij − α) cij < α + (L2x− β)+;
+(1− pij)C¯Li,j+1(x, α, β)
pijdijcij + pijC¯
L
i,j+1(x, 0, β + cij − α) α+ (L1x− β)+ ≥ cij,
+(1− pij)C¯Li,j+1(x, α, β) α ≤ cij;
pijdijcij + pijC¯
L
i,j+1(x, α− cij, β) α > cij,
+(1− pij)C¯Li,j+1(x, α, β) α+ (L1x− β)+ ≥ cij.
(4.3)
Therefore, EY,L{Costi[ai + xi(L − ai − a−i)+]} = C¯Li1[xi, ai, (ai + a−i)xi] can be evaluated
recursively. If L is uniformly distributed on [L1, L2], then from (4.2) and (4.3) we obtain
E[α+ (Lx− β)+] =

x = 0,
α+ (L2x− β)+ L1 = L2, or









In fact, the Cournot model is a special case of LSFE, where the supply function S(P ) = a;
also the expected cost function Ci,j(q) in the Cournot model is a special case of C¯
L
i,j(x =
0, α = q, β = 0).
































2 . Notice that here the variance of price under LSFE model is smaller than that
under Cournot model. We do not obtain an analytical expression for the variance of profit
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under LSFE model. Instead, we obtain the results shown in Section 4.5 using Monte Carlo
simulation.
For the purpose of obtaining the equilibrium solution (a∗i , b
∗
i ), we adopt a sequential
search procedure:
1. Set ki = 0, a
ki
i = 0, b
ki
i = 0, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Select an  > 0.
2. For i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
(aki+1i , b
ki+1
















and set ki = ki + 1.
3. If ∆ai = |akii − aki−1i | ≤  and ∆bi = |bkii − bki−1i | ≤  for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, stop; otherwise
go to step 2.
Thus the starting point of the algorithm is monopoly, and the firm obtains its optimal
linear supply function that will maximize its expected profit. And then the second firm
enters the market and obtains its optimal supply function subject to the residual demand
function. The third firm enters in a similar way as the second one, then it obtain its optimal
supply function based on the other two firms’ previous supply functions. Subsequently, the
three firms bid in the same order iteratively until the coefficients ai and bi converge. We use
two dimensional golden section search to solve the maximization problem in step 2. While
function E[pi(·)] is non-convex, one can only get a local optimal solution using this algorithm.
However, we conjecture based on our extensive experiments that the two dimensional golden
section search obtains the global optimal in most cases.




4.5.1 Demand and Supply
We consider a market which consists of three asymmetric firms with different mixes of gen-
erator types. Firm 1 has 12 generators, firm 2 has 8, and firm 3 has 10. The characteristics
of the units and their numbers are given in Tables 17 and 18. The last row in Table 17 refers
to the N thi unit of each firm. It has infinite capacity and is perfectly reliable. Its marginal
cost is assumed to be higher than that of the firm’s generators. The last two columns refer
to the generating units’ steady-state availability and the average 24-hour availability (under
the assumption that at the beginning of the period the unit is up). The terms MTTF and
MTTR refer to the mean uptime and mean downtime respectively. The values given in this
table have been extracted from [43].
We give two examples using different coefficients. In the first example, m = 38.5 and L
has a uniform distribution on [769, 1154]. This represents an 11.6% load variation. We also
use the steady state availability pij. Our solution approach for Nash Cournot equilibrium
is illustrated in Figures 16 to 19, and the results for both Cournot and LSFE models are
given in Tables 19 to 22. In the second example, m = 38.5 and L has a uniform distribution
on [913, 1010]. This represents a 2.9% load variation, a figure in agreement with the recent
literature [8, 9] on the short term load forecast errors. We also use the average availability
p¯ij. Results for this example are given in Tables 23 to 26.
Clearly, the results given in the second example are more relevant for the decision maker
who is considering making a day-ahead bid. In contrast, the first example illustrates how
varying assumptions on the load distribution and the generator availabilities affect the price
and profit statistics.
4.5.2 Cournot Model
For a given q−i, firm i’s expected profit is a function of qi. Our approach for obtaining
the Nash Cournot equilibrium is illustrated by the following figures. Figure 16 shows the
expected profit (expected revenue less the expected production cost) for firm 3 as a function
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Table 17: Generator unit data
Unit Unit Unit Marginal Availability Average
Group Type Capacity Cost MTTF MTTR pij Availability
cij dij p¯ij
U12 Oil/Steam 12 14.8 2940 60 0.98 0.996
U20 Oil/CT 20 8.0 450 50 0.90 0.978
U50 Hydro 50 1.0 1980 20 0.99 0.996
U76 Coal/Stem 76 14 1960 40 0.98 0.995
U100 Oil/Steam 100 14.8 1200 50 0.96 0.991
U155 Coal/Steam 155 14 960 40 0.96 0.990
U197 Oil/Steam 197 14.8 950 50 0.95 0.989
U350 Coal/Steam 350 14 1150 100 0.92 0.990
U400 Nuclear 400 0.4 1100 150 0.88 0.990
U∞ Market ∞ 30 – – 1.00 1.000
of q3 when q−3 = 480.75. Figure 17 are the derivative functions C ′3,1(q3) and R
′
3(q3|q−3), the
intersection of which yields the best response q∗3. Figure 18 is a plot of the piecewise linear
optimal response function q∗3(q−3) vs. q−3. Figure 19 illustrates the graphical solution of Nash
Cournot equilibrium. The intersection of the dashed equiangular line and the summation




i (Q) yields the market supply Q
∗, and the dashed
vertical line starting from Q∗ crosses each firm’s best response function q∗i (Q) at its supply
q∗i under equilibrium. Firms’ optimal bids and expected profits and standard deviation of
profits under Nash equilibrium are shown in Tables 22 and 26.
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Table 18: Firm unit data
Unit Number of Units Owned by
Group Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
U12 2 2 0
U20 1 1 1
U50 0 2 2
U76 2 1 1
U100 0 1 2
U155 2 0 0
U197 2 0 2
U350 2 0 0
U400 0 0 1
U∞ 1 1 1
4.5.3 LSFE Model
To determine the equilibrium solution for our numerical example, we use the sequential
search procedure outlined at the end of Section 4.4. As we see by the successive values of
the approximations in Tables 19 and 23, the solutions converged quite rapidly. The same
final values were reached using different firms as the initial starting points in the iterations.
Note that in general, even for LSFE with two decision variables ai and bi, the equilibrium
solution may not necessarily exist, nor does it have to be unique [35]. In our experiments,
however, we have been able to obtain the equilibria for a large range of parameter settings.
4.5.4 Model Comparisons
Table 20 gives a comparison of the mean and standard deviation of prices and the expected
values of total market supply under Cournot, LSFE, “perfect” SFE and Bertrand models. In
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Figure 16: Expected profit for q−3 = 480.75 with L ∼ U(769, 1154) and m = 38.5
the perfect SFE model, we assume that the realized value of load (occurring according to the
stipulated distribution) is known to each supplier who then offers its profit-maximizing bid
according to a Cournot model including generator failure. Note that the perfect SFE solution
in this case is identical to the corresponding Cournot equilibrium solution. In the Bertrand
model, we assume that firms bid their expected cost functions as supply functions. Here,
the expectation considers generator failure only. We observe that the LSFE model yields a
smaller expected value and standard deviation of price. The values for perfect SFE have been
obtained using Monte Carlo simulation. We hypothesize that this yields an upper bound to
expected profit, because the shape of the perfect SFE is not restricted. Table 21 captures the
effect of different assumptions on generator reliabilities. In the first row, the Cournot bids
are made assuming that the generators do not fail. The expected profit is however obtained
using the availability values, pij. In the second row, the generator capacities are derated.
The maximum cij is now multiplied by pij and in the remainder of the computations the pij
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Figure 17: Best response of q∗3 to q−3 = 480.75 with L ∼ U(769, 1154) and m = 38.5
values are ignored. The last two rows of the tables repeat similar computations for the LSFE
model. The model using derated capacities yields slightly higher values of the expected price
and larger values for the expected profit when compared to the Cournot model (ignoring
failures). The expected value for this case is less than that when failures are taken into
account as shown in Table 20. The conclusions from comparing the three LSFE models
are similar to those from the corresponding Cournot model. Table 22 gives the quantities
(expected quantities for the LSFE) and the expected values and standard deviation of profit
for each of the three different firms. Although the quantity values change very little, the
expected profits are less for each firm when the bids are made ignoring failures.
Tables 23, 24, 25 and 26 are counterparts of tables 19, 20, 21 and 22, respectively, with
pij substituted by p¯ij and the spread of the uniform load distribution reduced. They apply
for the day-ahead bid situation. The conclusions from the inter-model comparisons for this
situation remain the same as before. The LSFE model yields a smaller expected value and
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Figure 18: Best response function q∗3(q−3) with L ∼ U(769, 1154) and m = 38.5
standard deviation of profit than Cournot. The Bertrand model yields the lowest price,
the highest supply quantity, but lowest expected profit. Accounting for the possibility of
unit failures, the Cournot model yields a higher expected profit than when quantity bids
are offered while ignoring this uncertainty. Comparing Tables 22 and 26, we observe that
although statistics for firms 1 and 2 change very little, firm 3 has higher expected profit with
much lower standard deviation. This is undoubtedly a consequence of the large difference
between the values of pij and p¯ij for the base loaded nuclear unit, and its having a relatively
large value for its MTTF.
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Figure 19: Nash equilibrium outcome with L ∼ U(769, 1154) and m = 38.5
Table 19: Sequential search iteration results using pij and L ∼ U [769, 1154]
k a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 max{|∆ai|, |∆bi|}
0 56.2977 7.9560 61.2977 4.4223 261.1492 11.3414 —
1 14.5297 0.4658 67.4462 3.8744 247.8594 12.5006 41.7680
2 15.4563 0.3870 65.5544 4.0563 247.8594 12.5306 1.8918
3 15.4271 0.3885 65.5475 4.0588 247.8594 12.5318 0.0291
4 15.4271 0.3885 65.5475 4.0589 247.8594 12.5318 0.0001
5 15.4271 0.3885 65.5475 4.0589 247.8594 12.5318 0.0000
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Table 20: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under different models using pij and L ∼
U [769, 1154]
Model E[P ∗] S.D.(P ∗) E[Q∗] E[Π∗]
Cournot 11.76 2.89 508.59 4943.2
LSFE 11.40 1.00 522.46 4986.6
Perfect SFE1 11.93 1.48 502.03 5217.3
Bertrand 8.94 2.46 617.10 4333.1
1Same as perfect Cournot
Table 21: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under different models using pij and L ∼
U [769, 1154]
Model E[P ∗] S.D.(P ∗) E[Q∗] E[Π∗]
Cournot (Ignoring Failures) 11.03 2.89 536.75 4827.5
Cournot (Derated Capacities) 11.23 2.89 529.00 4876.2
LSFE (Ignoring Failures) 10.58 0.93 554.31 4821.7
LSFE (Derated Capacities) 10.95 0.99 539.87 4926.1
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Table 22: Equilibrium outcomes for each firm using pij and L ∼ U [769, 1154]
Cournot LSFE
q∗ E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗) (a∗, b∗) E[q∗] E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗)
Firm 1 20 63 68 (15.43, 0.39) 20 56 40
Firm 2 118 1119 353 (65.55, 4.06) 112 1074 243
Firm 3 371 3761 1634 (247.86, 12.53) 391 3857 1016
Cournot (Ignoring Failures) LSFE (Ignoring Failures)
q∗ E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗) (a∗, b∗) E[q∗] E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗)
Firm 1 20 49 68 (13.89, 0.53) 20 39 37
Firm 2 117 1031 350 (64.96, 4.40) 112 980 221
Firm 3 400 3748 1791 (251.49, 16.24) 423 3803 1035
Table 23: Sequential search iteration results using p¯ij and L ∼ U [913, 1010]
k a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 max{|∆ai|, |∆bi|}
0 122.1574 4.5758 64.7189 3.5281 235.6314 16.1959 —
1 17.3470 0.2384 74.8778 3.9372 232.7896 16.6475 104.8104
2 17.3943 0.2386 74.2296 4.0065 232.7896 16.6747 0.6482
3 17.3883 0.2390 74.2296 4.0085 232.7896 16.6756 0.0060
4 17.3883 0.2390 74.2296 4.0085 232.7896 16.6756 0.0001
5 17.3883 0.2390 74.2296 4.0085 232.7896 16.6756 0.0000
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Table 24: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under different models using p¯ij and L ∼
U [913, 1010]
Model E[P ∗] S.D.(P ∗) E[Q∗] E[Π∗]
Cournot 11.12 0.73 533.30 5353.7
LSFE 10.72 0.24 548.73 5265.1
Perfect SFE2 11.18 0.39 531.09 5510.1
Bertrand 8.73 0.44 625.37 4763.2
2Same as perfect Cournot
Table 25: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under different models using p¯ij and L ∼
U [913, 1010]
Model E[P ∗] S.D.(P ∗) E[Q∗] E[Π∗]
Cournot (Ignoring Failures) 11.03 0.7273 536.75 5315.9
Cournot (Derated Capacities) 11.09 0.73 534.53 5309.8
LSFE (Ignoring Failures) 10.68 0.2372 550.40 5256.0
LSFE (Derated Capacities) 10.68 0.24 550.47 5265.5
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Table 26: Equilibrium outcomes for each firm using p¯ij and L ∼ U [913, 1010]
Cournot LSFE
q∗ E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗) (a∗, b∗) E[q∗] E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗)
Firm 1 20 60 23 (17.39, 0.24) 20 52 10
Firm 2 113 1047 100 (74.23, 4.01) 117 1012 61
Firm 3 400 4247 509 (232.79, 16.68) 412 4201 274
Cournot (Ignoring Failures) LSFE (Ignoring Failures)
q∗ E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗) (a∗, b∗) E[q∗] E[pi∗] S.D.(pi∗)
Firm 1 20 58 23 (17.46, 0.23) 20 51 10
Firm 2 117 1047 103 (74.63, 3.91) 117 1008 61
Firm 3 400 4211 509 (238.09, 16.39) 413 4198 274
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this chapter we have provided an analytical procedure for calculating a Nash equilibrium
solution when firms submit bids (before the realization of uncertainties in demand and sup-
ply) that maximize their expected profits. Two different oligopoly market models have been
considered, Cournot and LSFE. We have enhanced these conventional models by including
supply side uncertainties in addition to the stochastic demand. The randomness on the
supply side is assumed here to be caused by the unpredictable failures of the generators. We
have not considered other important supply side uncertainties such as those affecting hydro
generation or fuel prices. The stochasticity associated with fuel prices can be accounted for
by assuming that the cost parameter dij has a probability distribution. [65] has used such
an approach for the Cournot model. The numerical values given in our tables may give
the reader the impression that inclusion of generation availabilities and load uncertainties
in the various oligopoly models do not make much differences in the statistics related to
electricity prices and the profits of individual firms. As a matter of fact, these comparisons
depend greatly on the assumed values for generator reliabilities and the parameters of the
load probability distribution. The contribution of this chapter has been in the development
of a mathematical framework in which the effect of these uncertainties on prices and profits
can be calculated for standard oligopoly models when the firms are not necessarily symmetric
and supply side uncertainties prevail. The results given in the chapter indicate that lower
prices and profits arise when the effects of generator failures are not considered in determin-
ing the bids. Notice that not including generator reliabilities is similar to assuming that all
generators are perfectly reliable, and all will be competing in the market. Therefore, under
this assumption the bids are determined assuming a more intense competition, which results
in lower prices. The costs are also affected by these uncertainties. The costs increase because
when the random demand is realized, some inexpensive generators may not be available and
the firm may need to use more expensive units. The analysis given in this chapter can also
enable one to compare the relative importance of load and capacity uncertainties [88].
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5.0 SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This thesis consists of three essays, representing three different but well connected facets of
the sophisticated electric power systems, where strategic and operational decisions at various
levels need to be made in different time frames. Due to the critical role of electricity as well
as its special properties, many decisions need to be made under uncertainty. These essays
thus serve as examples of using operations research techniques to assist decision making in
the electric power system.
5.1 SUMMARY
Chapter 2 analyzes four factors that have significant influence on the locational marginal
prices, and decomposes the mean and standard deviation of LMPs to contribution from
individual factors and their interactions. This approach not only presents a novel angle to
understand the LMPs, but also can be used to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of
system expansion projects.
As opposed to the simplifying 90% capacity reserve criterion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
attempts to find the “optimal” solution for the security constrained economic dispatch prob-
lem. Since an 100% secure and reliable dispatch strategy does not exist (it is conceptually
possible for all generation and transmission units to break down simultaneously due to natu-
ral disasters), the problem becomes of resolving how much tradeoff between system security
and economic benefit is appropriate. A key point in solving such a problem is to accurately
evaluate the economic impact of the risk, so that the risk can be converted to dollars and
combined with the generation cost as a single objective function for the system operator to
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minimize. Using the MDP model, we evaluate the economic impact of a dispatch decision by
calculating not only its immediate generation cost but also the risk imposed to the system
by such decision. Different contingency scenarios are treated as various states of the system,
and an optimal dispatch decision for each of the states is obtained from the solution to the
MDP model.
Chapter 4 examines how power suppliers compete with each other under different oligopoly
models as well as the presence of uncertainties (from both demand and supply sides). The
results in this chapter show that the LSFE model, as a generalized case of Bertrand and
Cournot, results in more competition than Cournot but less than Bertrand. The results on
the effect of uncertainty on the market power exercise is open ended. On the one hand, for
a single supplier, taking into account uncertainty improves its profitability. On the other
hand, all suppliers considering the uncertainty in their bids may or may not generate a more
favorable result than all suppliers ignoring the uncertainty.
These three essays present novelty from not only the methodological perspective, but
also from the application perspective. Similar ideas of attributing electricity prices to vari-
ous factors have been presented in the literature [21, 63, 70]. What enables Chapter 2 to take
a further step in implementing the idea is the system model, which quantitatively decom-
poses the prices to the contribution of individual factors as well as their interactions. The
application of sensitivity analysis results from parametric quadratic programming also plays
an important role in making the computation accurate and efficient. Chapter 3 examines
a well studied yet open problem, the security constrained economic dispatch. Instead of
focusing on a short period of time as most other papers do, this chapter takes the impact
of a dispatch decision to the entire future into the modeling consideration, and formulates
the problem as a Markov decision process model with continuous action space, which is
a relatively rarely studied model. The numerical example section in this chapter provides
experimental examples for the computational study of such model. Chapter 4 raises the
question of how demand and supply uncertainties affect the exercise of market power in the
electric power system, creatively uses the recursive function to solve the piecewise linear
expected cost function, and graphically obtains the Nash equilibrium.
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5.2 INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG THREE ESSAYS
An electric power system is such a sophisticated system that people usually have to restrict
their scope to small facets, make simplifying assumptions about certain details, and study
separate problems, like what is being done in this thesis. However, the three essays can be















s. t. qn − zn = dn,t(1 + t), (pn,t) ∀n ∈ N (5.2)∑
n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ 0.9Tl, ∀l ∈ L (5.3)
−∑n∈N Hl,nzn ≤ 0.9Tl, ∀l ∈ L (5.4)∑
n∈N zn = 0 (5.5)
0 ≤ qn ≤ 0.9Qn, ∀n ∈ S. (5.6)
The first essay assumes that (1) supply functions in (5.1) are constant and known, (2)
the system security is simply taken care of by the 90% criterion in (5.3), (5.4) and (5.6),
and transmission lines never fail. These (and other) simplifying assumptions enable one to
take a systemic and strategic perspective, and to use the system model to calculate impact
coefficients.
The second essay focuses on the dispatch decision making process at the operational
level, keeps assumption (1), relaxes assumption (2), and searches for the dispatch decision
that has the best tradeoff between cost efficiency and system security.
Assumption (1) is relaxed in the third essay, which examines the oligopoly competition
from two perspectives: what is the best strategy for a supplier to maximize its own profit,
and how the oligopoly competition will affect the price of electricity. Transmission con-
straints (5.3) and (5.4) are ignored to simplify the computation, but demand and supply
side uncertainties are introduced. The existing literature has also studied the oligopoly com-
petition with transmission constraints (5.3) and (5.4) but without demand and supply side
uncertainties, which will result in the MPEC formulation to be briefly discussed in Section
5.3.3.
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5.3 DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The research in this thesis has been conducted with the hope that it will (1) shed light
on a deeper understanding of decision making under uncertainty in electric power systems,
(2) provide novel modeling and computational perspectives on solving some of the existing
problems, and (3) outline or inspire future research on continuous improvement of the electric
power system towards a more efficient and reliable direction.
5.3.1 Discussions and Future Research Directions for Chapter 2
• More factors that affect LMPs significantly need to be considered. These include fuel
price change, transmission line failures, long term demand increase, etc. The assumption
of constant fuel prices restricts the analysis to a short time horizon. The fuel prices hav-
ing exhibited such volatile behavior during the past years, their impact on the electricity
prices remains an important yet open question. The system model used in Chapter 2
provides a unique and appropriate approach to such problem, because it can quantita-
tively differentiate the sole contribution of fuel price change from that of its interaction
among other factors.
It is assumed in the current model that, although capacity reserve criterion is used,
transmission line failures do not actually occur. To study the effects of transmission line
failures on the electricity prices, an extensive additional modeling and computational
effort will be needed. Some results from Chapter 3 may be useful in such extension.
Mean and standard deviation will not be sufficient in describing the random behavior
of LMPs, because the delivery of electricity could be interrupted by transmission line
failures. A risk index needs to be added to take such possibility into account. The
calculation of mean and standard deviation will also be complicated by transmission line
failures.
The computational techniques in Chapter 2 heavily depend on the assumption that de-
mands at all nodes increase or decrease by the same percentage simultaneously. Although
this is not completely unrealistic (according to the load data from PJM [1], the correlation
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between PJM-E and PJM-W is 0.8632), it will be more accurate to relax this assump-
tion and study non-perfect load correlation situations. The required computational effort
remains an open question.
• For modeling simplicity, it is assumed in Chapter 2 that supply functions never change.
However, it will be more interesting (and challenging) to study dynamic market power be-
havior under different scenarios. In such situation, the supply functions of all generators
need to be calculated for each possible system input parameter x = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. How-
ever, direct calculation of the Nash Equilibrium would lead to a sophisticated program
Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), which is one of the most
challenging mathematical programming problems, and to which no known algorithm is
guaranteed a solution.
• The locational marginal price pn,t is calculated as the dual of the equality constraint
(2.4) in the market clearing problem (2.3)-(2.8). However, unless certain constraint
qualifications hold, the optimal dual p∗n,t is not guaranteed to be unique or bounded.
For a nonlinear program min{f(x) : g(x) ≤ 0, h(x) = 0}, the Linear Independence
Constraint Qualification(LICQ) [31] at a feasible solution x0 requires that the gradients
∇gi(x0),∀i : gk(x0) = 0 and ∇hj(x0),∀j are linearly independent. If LICQ holds for
(2.3)-(2.8), then p∗n,t can be uniquely determined.
Theorem 2. LICQ holds for (2.3)-(2.8) when the congested transmission lines are
acyclic.






























 , and n =
 dN×1(1 + t)
0
 .
Let K be any set of congested lines that are acyclic. Without loss of generality, we use
HK×N · z = 0.9TK×1 to represent the active thermal limit constraints, since a power flow
has only one direction, and the two thermal limit constraints
HL×N · z ≤ 0.9TL×1
−HL×N · z ≤ 0.9TL×1
cannot both be active. Using only the constraints with plus signs does not change the
argument about the linear independency that follows.









For i = 1, 2, 3, 4, let Wi denote the i
th block of rows in W . The linear independence
of W{2,3,4} is easy to see. If we can prove that HK×N has a rank |K|, then the linear
independence of W1 as well as W1 with W{2,3,4} will be clear, which will also complete
the proof.
The PTDF matrix H is calculated using the formula given in [76] on page 316:
H = ΩA(A>ΩA)−1,
97
where AL×(N−1) is the reduced arc-node incidence matrix, ΩL×L is a positive diagonal





Showing that HK×N has a rank |K| is equivalent to show that
HK×(N−1) = ΩK×KAK×(N−1)(A>(N−1)×LΩL×LAL×(N−1))
−1
has a rank |K|. We know that HK×(N−1) has |K| rows, so rank[HK×(N−1)] ≤ |K|. On the











≥ rank [(A>(N−1)×LΩL×LAL×(N−1))−1]− dim{Null[ΩK×KAK×(N−1)]}
= (|N | − 1)− (|N | − 1− |K|) (5.7)
= |K|,





= |N | − 1− rank[ΩK×KAK×(N−1)],
and ΩK×K is a positive diagonal matrix, also the rank of a reduced acyclic arc-node
incidence matrix AK×(N−1) equals |K|. Therefore,
rank[HK×(N−1)] = |K|.
This completes the proof.
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5.3.2 Discussions and Future Research Directions for Chapter 3
• A larger system needs to be tested to study the efficiency and convergence of the al-
gorithm, which could be computationally a challenging task. An alternative approach
would be to study heuristic or approximation algorithms that overcome the curse of
dimensionality.
• Instead of converting system risk into dollars, the multi-objective approach seems to
provide a natural alternative perspective to examine the same problem. One objective
is to minimize the generation cost, and the other objective is to minimize the risk of
cascading failures. A dispatch decision that has larger objective values than another dis-
patch decision in both objective functions is called a dominated decision. The collection
of all non-dominated dispatch decisions forms a Pareto frontier. The inevitable tradeoff
between cost and risk is more apparent to observe from Figure 20. In this example of
Pareto frontier, each point represents the cost minimizing dispatch for the given level of
risk, or the risk minimizing dispatch for the given level of cost. The “optimal” dispatch
will need to be selected from the Pareto frontier by the decision maker according to
specific system requirements.
Figure 20: An example of a Pareto frontier
99
5.3.3 Discussions and Future Research Directions for Chapter 4
• The effect of uncertainty on the exercise of market power demands more study from the
game theory perspective. The numerical examples in Chapter 4 do not demonstrate much
difference between considering the uncertainty and ignoring it. However, not considering
uncertainty while all other competitors do would hurt a supplier’s profitability. Therefore,
considering uncertainty is not only a rational option for any supplier, but also a necessary
strategy to survive in the market competition.
• Transmission constraints could also be added into the model, resulting in a Mathematical
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [64]. An MPEC [64] is defined as
min{f(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ Z, y ∈ S(x)},
where for each x ∈ X, S(x) is the solution set of the variational inequality VI(F (x, ·), C(x));
i.e., y ∈ S(x) if and only if y ∈ C(x) and (v − y)>F (x, y) ≥ 0,∀v ∈ C(x).
The deterministic version of the game is a well studied problem (see [25, 53] for example,
which are not considering demand and supply uncertainties), but both theoretical and
computational techniques are still evolving, and no known algorithm is guaranteed to
find a global optimal solution. As a matter of fact, MPEC is a subproblem in EPEC.
MPEC represents the best response action of a supplier who tries to maximize its own
profit assuming other suppliers’ actions are known, while EPEC is the Nash Equilibrium
state where no supplier has an incentive to unilaterally change its action. In the current
literature, a local optimum is treated as the solution to MPEC, and different suppliers’
MPECs are iteratively solved with the hope that an equilibrium occurs. Both convergence
and cycle have been observed and reported in the literature [53]. A possible alternative
could be a modified version of the game-theoretic model, where optimality conditions
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